w1

01/11 - Introduction

w2

01/16 - Solon

• E. M. Harris, “Did Solon Abolish Debt-Bondage?” CQ 52 (2002) 415–430
  • What is the difference between debt-bondage and debt-slavery and why should we care?
  • How does Harris' reconstruction alter the typical portrait of the causes and nature of Solonic reforms?
  • Is Harris' reconstruction potentially compatible with the arguments of Andrewes, French, Gallant, et al.?
• E. M. Harris, “A New Solution to the Riddle of Seisachtheia"
  • How fully is the metaphorical reading (105-106) expanded; can you add?
  • Does the simile at Hom. Il. 12.421-424 add anything? ἀλλ’ ὥς τ’ ἀμφ’ οὔροισι δύ’ ἀνέρε δηριάασθον / μέτρ’ ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντες ἐπιξύνῳ ἐν ἀρούρῃ, / ὥ τ’ ὀλίγῳ ἐνὶ χώρῳ ἐρίζητον περὶ ἴσης, / ὣς ἄρα τοὺς διέεργον ἐπάλξιες
  • How does this argument fit with the previous? How does the combined picture of Solonian Athens differ from what you learned in grade school?
• L. Foxhall, “A View from the Top: Evaluating the Solonian Property Classes”
  • How and why was Solon's 'legislation' a political football?
  • How and why is Solon's 'legislation' a "testing ground" (p114) for modern models?
  • How does Foxhall's conclusion depart from the other models that she rehearses?
  • Does this argument resonate in any way with what you know about early Roman history?
  • What does agricultural extensification have to do with this argument? with Harris'?
  • What does Foxhall mean when she suggests (p129) that the Solonian telê "represent a formalisation of access to land for those with sufficient wealth, circumventing any dependency relationships"?
• Finley, Ancient Economy ch.1-2 (notes) [see also Plut. Per. 16.3–5 | or at Perseus]
  • We have no actuarial table for use in maritime loans (p23). So?
  • What do you think it means to "concentrate on the dominant types, the characteristic modes of behaviour" (p29; see again p38)?
  • How do you read Aristotle's notion (Rhet. 1367a, in Finley p41) that freedom means "not liv[ing] under the constraint of another," which includes working for a wage?
  • What does it mean to ask (p43) whether Cic. De off. 1.150-151 does or does not "accurately reflect the prevalent pattern of behaviour in Cicero's time?"
  • What do you think is going on at Plut. Per. 16.3-6? ἐφύλαξεν ἑαυτὸν ἀνάλωτον ὑπὸ χρημάτων, καίπερ οὐ παντάπασιν ἀργῶς ἔχων πρὸς χρηματισμόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν πατρῷον καὶ δίκαιον πλοῦτον, ὡς μήτ’ ἀμελούμενος ἐκφύγοι μήτε πολλὰ πράγματα καὶ διατριβὰς ἀσχολουμένῳ παρέχοι, συνέταξεν εἰς οἰκονομίαν ἣν ᾤετο ῥᾴστην καὶ ἀκριβεστάτην εἶναι. (4) τοὺς γὰρ ἐπετείους καρποὺς παντας ἀθρόους ἐπίπρασκεν, εἶτα τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἕκαστον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ὠνούμενος διῴκει τὸν βίον καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δίαιταν. (5) ὅθεν οὐχ ἡδὺς ἦν ἐνηλίκοις παισὶν οὐδὲ γυναιξὶ δαψιλὴς χορηγός, ἀλλ’ ἐμέμφοντο τὴν ἐφήμερον ταύτην καὶ συνηγμένην εἰς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον δαπάνην, οὐδενὸς οἷον ἐν οἰκίᾳ μεγάλῃ καὶ πράγμασιν ἀφθόνοις περιρρέοντος, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μὲν ἀναλώματος, παντὸς δὲ λήμματος δι’ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ μέτρου βαδίζοντος. (6) ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην συνέχων ἀκρίβειαν εἷς ἦν οἰκέτης Εὐάγγελος, ὡς ἕτερος οὐδεὶς εὖ πεφυκὼς ἢ κατεσκευασμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ Περικλέους πρὸς οἰκονομίαν.
  • How would you characterize Cephalus (p48) in terms of Order, Class, Status?
  • Brutus, Caesar, and Cassius lent money, but were not moneylenders; this wasn't their job (pp54-55); no prominent equites are known to have been primarily merchants or traders (p58). What is at issue here?

01/18 - Empire

• A. Blamire, “Athenian Finance, 454–404 B.C.” Hesperia 70 (2001) 99–126
  • If you had to generate three paper topics from this article, what would they be?
  • What does this piece tell/remind us about the relationship between religion and economics?
  • What would the portrait drawn by this article look like without epigraphy? without Thucydides?
  • The author writes often of "publication" of information. What does this mean in the ancient context?
  • Can you identify 12 sources of state revenue about which we know something?
  • Which categories of expenditure seem to loom largest in the evidence gathered here?
  • What purpose did the accounts of, e.g., Athena and the Other Gods serve? Or, why did gods keep track of their fungibles?
  • We find occasional reference to Athenian coin and foreign coin (e.g. p107). What was the difference? Why keep track?
  • If in fact the term of the Hellenotamiai was synchronized to that of the sacred treasurers--from the civil to the Panathenaic year--what are the implications of this change?
  • Generals to submit annual cost estimates and apply for extra levy if tribute does not meet need; IG I³ 71.46-50: τὸς δὲ στρατεγὸς] χρε῀σθαι π|[ερὶ το῀ φ]όρο κατα[σκέφσει καθ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐχσετ]ά̣[σαντας κατὰ γε῀ν κα]ὶ θάλατταν πρ[ο῀τον πόσ]α δεῖ ἒ ἐ[ς τὰς στρ]α[τιὰς ἒ ἐς ἄλλο τι ἀναλίσκεν· ἐν δὲ τε῀ι ℎέδραι τ]ε῀̣ς βολε῀ς τε῀ι πρό[τει περὶ] τ[o]ύτο α̣[ἰεὶ δίκ]α̣ς [ἐσαγόντον ἄνευ τε῀ς ἑλιαίας καὶ τ]ο῀ν ἄλλον δικαστερίον ἐὰμ μ[ὲ δικαστο῀ν] προ῀[τον δικα]σ̣ά[ντον ἐσάγεν φσεφίσεται ℎο] δε῀μ[ος]·
  • Does this argument, and the evidence arrayed, support or undermine the idea that city-states had no 'economic policy'?
  • What are the ATL and how important are they to this survey?
  • What are the so-called "Attic Stelai (IG I³ 421-430)" (p114)? [421 | 422 | 426 | 427]
  • What do the expedients of 413/12 and 406/5 (pp115, 123-124) tell/remind you about the nature of ancient currency?
  • Much of what you read, on this period, in Thucydides and textbooks tells a political story. Can you see elements of that narrative played out in the data assembled here?
• Thuc. "Archaeology" 1.2–19
  • 1.2: How are pre-'Greek' Greeks characterized?
  • 1.4: τό τε λῃστικόν, ὡς εἰκός, καθῄρει ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐδύνατο, τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἰέναι αὐτῷ. Policy? Piracy?
  • What is the point of the observations on dress, at 1.6.3-4?
  • What's a pirate? 1.8.2-3: καταστάντος δὲ τοῦ Μίνω ναυτικοῦ πλωιμώτερα ἐγένετο παρ’ ἀλλήλους (οἱ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νήσων κακοῦργοι ἀνέστησαν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὅτεπερ καὶ τὰς πολλὰς αὐτῶν κατῴκιζε), (3) καὶ οἱ παρὰ θάλασσαν ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ἤδη τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν χρημάτων ποιούμενοι βεβαιότερον ᾤκουν, καί τινες καὶ τείχη περιεβάλλοντο ὡς πλουσιώτεροι ἑαυτῶν γιγνόμενοι· ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν οἵ τε ἥσσους ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, οἵ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἔχοντες κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, προσεποιοῦντο ὑπηκόους τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις
  • 1.13: Corinth : Minos how? Policy? Piracy?
• Finley, Ancient Economy ch.3-4 [see also Pliny Ep. 10.54-55 | Ep. 3.19]
  • Compare comments on thêtes (p66) to Harris, CQ 52 (2002) 417-419, 422, 424
  • "Were these citizen-bondsmen, before their liberation, free men or not? I find this a meaningless question and worse, a misleading question, reflecting th false triad I mentioned earlier whereby we try to force all labout into one of three categories, slave, serf, or free" (p66). Do you think this is an idle question? [CA?] A variation on that theme (as asked last time): What is the difference between debt-bondage and debt-slavery and why should we care?
  • pp75-76: Why was acquisition of wealth left in the hands of slaves and freedmen? One suggestion is that unfree had better efficiency and training. But this is circular since the free were unwilling to work for another; we need to focus on that fact, rather than make a false choice between the two types (free and unfree) of managerial labor. Assumptions here? How does the logic of this work?
  • On the parity of wages to free and unfree (p80): "We may believe that the free men were thus being kept down by the slaves, both in competition for employment and in the rates of pay. But they never argued that; as I said before, complaints about slaves and slavery that have come down are moral, not economic." How does this relate back to the claims at pp75-76?
  • [CA?] On p100, Finley cites the case of Herodes Atticus' grandfather having his estate sold because he "got into trouble," sold for a price 100mil Ses. by Domitian. What could be troubling about using this as an example? Think Cicero Pro Roscio Amerino.
  • On Greek and Roman inability to make small, simple improvements in agricultural productivity (p109): "But there is nothing mysterious about this "stagnation", no serious reason for disbelief: large incomes, absenteeism and its accompanying psychology of the life of leisure, of land ownership as a non-occupation, and, when it was practised, letting or sub-letting in fragmented tenancies all combined to block any search for radical improvements." How good is the question? the answer?
  • What is your take on self-sufficiency? What did it mean on the ground, to the rich, to the poor, as a slogan, as an operational principle?
  • What is your take on the passage quoted (p116) from Petronius (Sat. 53.3, at pp115-116): "in arcam relatum est, quod collocari non potuit, sestertium centies"?
  • For Trimalchio et al. there were three places to put money, land, strong-box, short-term loans at interest; also a bit in ("a small fraction") "ships, urban house property, warehouses, slave-craftsmen and raw materials" (p116). Responses?
  • "Pliny neither calculated nor claimed that the second Umbrian estate would produce a higher return than the loans he would have to call in to meet the purchase price. He spoke only of the gain in amenity" (p117). True enough. What is your readerly take on Pliny's remarks?
  • We see repeatedly that investment in land is first and foremost a moral gesture. Are there any other ways to look at it?
• Pliny Ep. 10.54-55
  • What is your take on the options presented by Pliny?
  • Finley underscores (p118): (1) the "familiar trinity, cash on hand, land, money on loan," (2) the fact that neither city nor emperor had a problem letting the cash sit idle, (3) the unavailability of land for purchase. How do you interpret this constellation of facts?
• Ep. 3.19
  • What is the point(s) of this letter? What does it do?
• I bring to class: Pliny Ep. 6.19
  • Does the last sentence of the letter, which Finley does not cite (pp119-120) add anything to our understanding?
  • How is this episode related to the problem that the legislation sought to correct?

w3

01/23 - Doing Good

• Whitehead, "Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: ΦΙΛΟΤΙΜΙΑ in Democratic Athens," ClMed 34 (1983) 55-74
  • [CA]: Some basic thoughts regarding Thucydides: Does Thucydides offer a clear or acceptable explanation for the accumulation of wealth and power in the Greek world? What trends are evident in the archaeology and does his model work?
  • [CA]: Doing good: Do benefactions fit into the concept of gift exchange? What kinds of social capital or economic gains does the honorand recieve? Are there legal privileges? Could "benefactors" then be considered altruistic? IG II² 1176, IG II² 300. Also, how did approbatory language change, if at all, in the Hellenistic period? (OGIS 56 as well as OGIS 90 - the Rosetta Stone - are interesting examples).
    • [jds]: Canopus decree (OGIS 56) / Rosetta Stone (OGIS 90)
  • [CA]: Are Whitehead's arguments over "approbatory language" useful? Was this type of language "already common currency" when it began to be put on stone? Did popular literature pave the way? What do we think about the view that these honors are "cliches"?
  • [jds]: What, in a nutshell, is the history of the connotation of φιλοτμία and its etymological congeners from Homer through the 4th c. BC? What, if anything, does this tell us about the relationship between politics and economics?
  • [jds]: What is the significance of the so-called (p63) "manifesto-clause"?
  • [jds]: Does the following necessarily assume decline in the vitality of the democratic state (pp65-66): “the doctrine of demosia philotimia served as a | spur as well as a rein, in attacking apathy and keeping the cumbersome wheels of the democratic administration in motion.”
  • [jds]: Why does it matter whether the honorands were Athenian citizens (see pp66-68)?
  • [jds]: How are we to think about the relationship of honor and reward?
  • [jds]: Honors for Herakleides: IG II² 360.
  • [jds]: A spur: IG II² 488
• OPTIONAL: Whitehead, "Cardinal Virtues: The Languagae of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens," ClMed 44 (1993) 37-75
  • [DG]: IG I³ 17
  • Q

DISCUSSION CHAIR: CA

01/25 - Doing Bad

• Christ, The Bad Citizen ch.4 [61pp.]
  • Terms:
    • eisphora,
    • proeisphora,
    • liturgy,
    • antidosis,
    • symmoria,
    • timêma,
    • chorêgia,
    • trierarchy,
    • skêpsis,
    • diadikasia,
    • epidosis,
  • What did the reform of 378/7 do? What do you think was its purpose?
  • Why would a person like festival liturgies but resent eisphora? trierarchies?
  • The eisphora-symmory+proeisphora system places the burden of collection on the citizen liturgist (p147); selection to the class may have been conducted by generals, maybe coordinating with demarchs (p149). What does this distribution of effort tell us about the state's role in 'taxation'?
  • Similarly, antidosis: who does what and what does the mechanism do? See esp. comments on p187.
  • On what grounds could you NOT claim exemption from liturgy? What do grounds for exemption and the nature of the process tell us about the way the system worked?
  • C. suggests (p151) that magistrates probably did not share any information on eligible candidates for eisphora; why not? Is this an inefficiency in the system? a design flaw? an accidental result of some necessary feature? a good thing for one or another party?
  • [MM] Christ tells us that the demarchs were probably the ones most often responsible for identifying wealthy individuals in their own demes for liturgical service. He talks about various strategies for avoiding public financial service in pp. 194-198, but seems to focus almost exclusively on ways in which rich men could exploit each other to this end. Given his own belief that everyone tends to act selfishly, I wonder whether there is any good evidence for less wealthy demarchs (or other public officials) abusing their position. Especially given that most public offices were unpaid, being in a position to choose who goes on the list of names given to the archons seems like an extraordinary opportunity to make money via bribes or other sorts of palm-greasing. -- Addendum: I suppose the revolving nature of the demarch's position might make retributary gestures a concern and thus discourage abuse. After all, screwing over your neighbours for money isn't the best idea when they might be in your position next year.
  • We read of a "System under pressure" (pp155-171). How is this a political story? an economic one? Does change--these changes anyway--necessarily speak of problems in the system? against Gabrielsen's view (p155) that the system basically worked pretty well?
  • ...deme liturgies (p173) ... who ever said anything about deme liturgies?
  • Does the ancient rhetoric equating liturgists with slaves (p189) remind you of anything we have seen already?
  • What are the basic complaints of unfairness (pp184-187)? How can we relate this apparent fissure in Athenian society back to our discussion of the Solonian telê? seisachtheia?
    • Or, we have read already about an institution that split the Athenian population into orders based on wealth (Solonian telê); the liturgical system in affect did the same. Compare the two gestures.
  • If you were a member of an eisphora symmory after 378 (assuming C.'s theory about the nature of the reform is correct) what considerations would affect your framing of your timêma (see pp147, 149, 194)?
  • Are you shocked to learn (p200) that "on returning to Athens, trierarchs apparently often held on to their ship's state-owned equipment"? C. suggests that this might have happened less if not for the fact that naval officials were themselves involved in the same shady behavior. Any other reasons--institutional ones?--why this might have been common?
  • Is there any aspect of this story that is susceptible to crunching of numbers? Where would we start?
  • [CA]: C. states that the obligations of liturgies and eisphora must be met in one way or another, but what is the penalty for anyone who either can't pay or refuses to pay? Do the ones who pay the proseisphora break his thumbs?
  • [CA]: C. discusses the exchange of property among the liturgical class as a means for one of the less wealthy to meet his obligations (p153). How does this work exactly? C. says that it's rare, but would he ask another rich friend to pay the difference and share the charis?
  • [CA]: (p156): C. notes that the liturgical system originated from the Cleisthenic reforms, but may have pre-democratic antecedents. Although we have no direct evidence - what are some of the theories? Archaic/aristocratic culture? Does it have anything to do with Solon's sumptuary laws?
• Lys. 21
  • The moral dimension, 11: Καὶ οὕτω πολλοὺς κινδύνους ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κεκινδυνευκὼς καὶ τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ εἰργασμένος τὴν πόλιν, νυνὶ δέομαι οὐ δωρεὰν ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ἀντὶ τούτων παρ’ ὑμῶν λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ στερηθῆναι τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος καὶ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι παρά τε ἑκόντος ἐμοῦ καὶ παρ’ ἄκοντος λαμβάνειν. How does this bear on Finley's comments about the "moral" nature of ancient thoughts about slavery, land, wealth?
  • The moral dimension, 12: καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτόν μοι μέλει εἴ με δεῖ τὰ ὄντα ἀπολέσαι· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην ὑβρισθῆναι, οὐδὲ παραστῆναι τοῖς διαδυομένοις τὰς λῃτουργίας ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀχάριστα εἶναι τὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένα, ἐκείνους δὲ δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι ὅτι ὑμῖν οὐδὲν προεῖνται τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν. How does this bear on Finley's comments about the "moral" nature of ancient thoughts about slavery, land, wealth?
  • The speaker argues (13-14): the property of liturgists is the state’s most secure revenue; the state should take care of their money as it does its own, to ensure access to their money in the future; the speaker will tend his own money better than the city magistrates will; if the speaker is reduced to poverty the state won’t get his wealth, for it will be divided up. This sounds familiar to modern ears, but in what way is this a particularly Athenian response?
  • Again, the moral dimension (19): δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὴν αὐτὴν νῦν περὶ ἐμοῦ γνώμην ἔχειν ἥνπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ τέως χρόνῳ, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῶν δημοσίων λῃτουργιῶν μεμνῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ἡγουμένους ταύτην εἶναι λῃτουργίαν τὴν ἐπιπονωτάτην, διὰ τέλους τὸν πάντα χρόνον κόσμιον εἶναι καὶ σώφρονα καὶ μήθ’ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς ἡττηθῆναι μήθ’ ὑπὸ κέρδους ἐπαρθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον παρασχεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὥστε μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε μέμψασθαι μήτε δίκην τολμῆσαι προσκαλέσασθαι.
  • How would you respond to the question put at 22: μαινοίμην γὰρ <ἄν>, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ τὴν μὲν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν φιλοτιμούμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκοιμι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τῆς πόλεως κακῷ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δωροδοκοίην.
• A few other things worth / still worth reading
  • Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes 109-116.
  • Harrison, Law of Athens II 232-238.
  • M. Christ, “The Evolution of the Eisphora in Classical Athens,” CQ 57 (2007) 53–69.
  • idem, "Liturgy Avoidance and Antidosis in Classical Athens," TAPA 120 (1990) 147-169.
  • V. Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet (Baltimore 1994).
  • idem, "ΦΑΝΕΡΑ and ΑΦΑΝΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑ in Classical Athens,” ClMed 37 (1987) 99–114.
  • idem, "The Antidosis Procedure in Classical Athens," ClMed 38 (1987) 7-38.
  • R. Thomsen, Eisphora: A Study on Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens (Copenhagen 1964).
  • B. Brun, Eisphora, syntaxis, stratiotika (Paris 1983).

w4

01/30 - Banking

• Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society ch. 1-3
  • [JDS] Terms / concepts
    • tokos eggeios
    • tokos nautikos
    • diagraphê
    • nauklêros
    • allagê
    • phanera / aphanês
    • bank (Dem. 36.11): ἐργασία προσόδους ἔχουσ’ ἐπικινδύνους ἀπὸ χρημάτων ἀλλοτρίων
    • Money supply = bank deposits + cash in circulation (p13)
    • hypomnêma
    • talent / mina / stater / drachma / obol
  • [JDS] Why such attention (pp xii-xiii) to diachrony vs. synchrony? What is Cohen batting against here?
  • [JDS] Do you understand the exercise in which Cohen explains (pp12-14) the creation of bank money? the distinction, in this explanation, between money and currency?
  • [JM] Cohen's first chapter persuades me that ancient banks created wealth (cf. pp. 11-18). In modern parlance, they issued credit. Are there any ancient credit collapses on record? Was pistis ever so threatened that an ancient bank went down the tubes?
  • [JM] Cohen's positive argument against the 'ancient banker as pawnbroker' model (cf. pp. 22-5) is rhetorically convincing and well supported by the evidence he cites. It is almost too good, making me suspect that there must be more to the model than he admits. Why would any rational student of the evidence understand the fourth-century Athenian banker as a pawnbroker? Cohen calls such understanding 'a modern anachronism.' This is interesting to me because, if accurate, it shows us moderns deliberately seeing the economy of fourth-century Athens as most different from our own where a simple reading of the evidence would make it most similar. How do we distinguish between true and false parallels between antiquity and modernity?
  • [JM] What is it about numbers that commands respect in modern discourse? Why do people (even people with PhDs) assume that numbers always tell the truth more than other forms of communication? (Cf. Cohen's discussion of cliometrics, p. 27ff.)
    • [JDS] Still worth seeing D. Huff, How to Lie with Statistics (NY 1954), which used to be--maybe still is--required reading for the ANS summer seminar.
  • [JM] Does anyone know anything about Millet's 900 consumer loans (p. 34), mentioned in passing and then abandoned? Does anyone want to put a word in against Cohen, modern economics, and common sense by finding some unarbitrary way of determining whether a loan is consumptive or productive at the moment of issue?
  • [JDS] On Erxleben, Isager/Hansen, and Bogaert (pp29-36): is the issue that we do not want to know how to slice the productive/consumptive pie? that we want to know but cannot know given the evidence that we have? that we want to know but never can?
  • [JM] Why do "modern scholars...warn against 'the invention of categories to match up with the types of loans found in the sources' and insist on analyzing Athenian loans through modern (or actually protomodern) terminology" (p. 35)? This sounds like the antithesis of classical scholarship to me. Who are these scholars and where do they learn their methods?
  • [JDS] Is there another way to describe "freedom from regulation and oligopoly" (pp42-44)? How does this "freedom" in-/consistent with what we know about, say, the liturgy system?
  • [JM] How widely have Cohen's ideas about landed yield and maritime yield as complementary opposites (cf. pp. 44-60) been accepted? Why is our modern way of calculating interest solely chronological?
  • [JM] Why was the Athenian economy so fragmented (pp. 43-4)?
  • [JDS] Cohen's articulation (pp52-60) of maritime and landed tokos makes an implicit claim about priority. What are the merits of that claim?
• Isocr. 17
  • [JDS] What was the son of Sopaios doing in Athens? Isoc. 17.4: Πυνθανόμενος δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως καὶ περὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐπεθύμησ’ ἀποδημῆσαι. Γεμίσας οὖν ὁ πατήρ μου δύο ναῦς σίτου καὶ χρήματα δοὺς ἐξέπεμψεν ἅμα κατ’ ἐμπορίαν καὶ κατὰ θεωρίαν· Cf. Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens 208: the son of Sopaios "was tthe son of the right-hand man of Satyrus, king of the Bosposrus, and travelling 'to see the world' (kata theôrian) -- and outsider arriving in Athens." Re "right-hand man", cf. 17.3: Ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ, πατὴρ μέν ἐστι Σωπαῖος, ὃν οἱ πλέοντες εἰς τὸν Πόντον ἅπαντες ἴσασιν οὕτως οἰκείως πρὸς Σάτυρον διακείμενον ὥστε πολλῆς μὲν χώρας ἄρχειν, ἁπάσης δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ἐκείνου. There were other Bosporans in Athens too: (17.5): Χρόνῳ δ’ ὕστερον διαβολῆς πρὸς Σάτυρον γενομένης ὡς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ οὑμὸς ἐπιβουλεύοι τῇ ἀρχῇ κἀγὼ τοῖς φυγάσιν συγγιγνοίμην, τὸν μὲν πατέρα μου συλλαμβάνει, ἐπιστέλλει δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδ’ ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τά τε χρήματα παρ’ ἐμοῦ παραλαβεῖν καὶ αὐτὸν εἰσπλεῖν κελεύειν· What were they doing there? Why wasn't SoS' money them in the first place?
  • [JDS] The son of Sopaios claims (9) that Pasion lied to Philomelus and Menexenus, when they tried to cash out his account, claiming that there was no such account (ἔξαρνος γίγνεται πρὸς αὐτοὺς μηδὲν ἔχειν τῶν ἐμῶν). Need such a denial have been devious?
  • [JM] What scenarios can we construct in which Pasion is the victim rather than the perpetrator? Taking the opposite tack and assuming his guilt along the lines laid out in the speech, why would he admit the servile status of Cittus and agree to have him tortured (14-5)? Was he a spineless man lacking cash (cf. 17) and the guts to follow through on a desperate attempt to cheat a foreigner on the brink of disaster?
  • [JM] Recalling what was said earlier about the actual torture of slaves being unattested, I wonder who the people chosen to torture Cittus (15) were. The speech makes it sound as though ordinary citizens might have been called up to interrogate slaves, but we are never actually told much about the process by which Cittus' torturers were chosen. Does anyone know any more about them or their ilk?
  • [JDS]: What does Pasion fear at 18: Καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἤλθομεν εἰς ἀκρόπολιν, ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἔκλαεν καὶ ἔλεγεν ὡς ἠναγκάσθη μὲν δι’ ἀπορίαν ἔξαρνος γενέσθαι, ὀλίγου δὲ χρόνου πειράσοιτο τὰ χρήματ’ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐδεῖτο δέ μου συγγνώμην ἔχειν αὑτῷ καὶ συγκρύψαι τὴν συμφορὰν, ἵνα μὴ παρακαταθήκας δεχόμενος φανερὸς γένηται τοιαῦτ’ ἐξημαρτηκώς.
  • [JM] What sort of person comes before a jury, admits conspiring earlier with another to lie to them and the whole town, and then demands that they punish his fellow conspirator for remaining true to the lie? What kind of honesty is operative here? How can the plaintiff demand justice from Pasion? [These questions are not rhetorical. I know he can, and did; I am just interested in exploring the reasoning and the ethics behind his claim.]
  • [JDS] Why is this particular example of a crooked friend (33-34) so compelling to an Athenian jury?

DISCUSSION CHAIR: JM

02/01 - Banking

• Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society ch.4
  • From before: How do you read Aristotle's notion (Rhet. 1367a, in Finley p41) that freedom means "not liv[ing] under the constraint of another," which includes working for a wage? This now in the light of Cohen pp70-73.
  • From before: Brutus, Caesar, and Cassius lent money, but were not moneylenders; this wasn't their job (Finley 54-55); no prominent equites are known to have been primarily merchants or traders (Finley 58). What is at issue here?
  • On importance of familiarity, "use" (chrêsthai), Cohen pp65-66.
  • 80n.93: I.Erythrae 9
  • What social and legal institutions can we see constraining / promoting bank activity in 4th-c. Athens?
  • What is the significance of bank slaves standing up to free citizens (p93), of women transacting business (77-79), of douloi chôris oikountes (pp97-98)?
  • Slaves are essential because free men don't work or because free workers posed risks (pp70-73) or because slaves provided other benefits (pp94-96)? Does it matter which cause we place at the center?
  • [JF] On p. 71, Cohen states that free men did not work for others for an extended period of time. Other than independent craft or business, how would free citizens have survived? There was jury service, assembly (6,000 men, perhaps about 20% of the population), and armed forces. How else would they have made their money? Were there any other “welfare” or public maintenance funds available from the state? For the “incapacitated”?
  • [JF] On p. 76, Cohen writes that Phormio entered into operating leases giving him complete control of Pasion’s bank and shield workshop. Since banking placed so much emphasis on the oikos and the kyrios, wouldn’t the leasing of a bank go against the interests of the banker? On p. 95, Cohen cites the possibility that bankers leased their banks to free themselves from the liability of the slaves’ contractual commitments. This sounds like it might be feasible—any other ideas?
  • [JF] On p. 88, Cohen asserts that “banking oikoi of slave origin signaled the rise of a new “mixed” Athenian establishment” which included metics, former slaves, naturalized citizens and the traditional elite. Cohen states that seven banking slaves were known to be enfranchised (88); would this be enough to dramatically change the composition of the aristocratic class? Would there be many enfranchised slaves of other occupations that would perhaps alter the composition of the class?
  • [MM] I'm interested in disentangling the complicated history of Pasion's successor/s. First, Cohen tells us that Pasion chose Phormion to take over the bank rather than his son Apollodorus, but later calls Apollodorus a bank owner (even though he also tells us that Apollodorus moved his residence to the country, which would have been an inconvenient place to do business). Perhaps the ramifications are insignificant-- maybe Apollodorus started his own bank after Pasion's death (or before?). Still, Cohen never really explains this. Perhaps Phormion paid a lease to Pasion's son as he had to Pasion himself (?)-- this would necessarily alter our perception of Cohen's discussion of slaves' responsibilities in banking. I may be missing some obvious point, but some clarification about Apollodorus' role in the aftermath of Pasion's death would be nice.
  • What are the dikai emporikai and what is their siignificance (pp97-98)?
  • What is egktêsis and what is its sigfnificance (pp99-101?)?
    
• Dem. 49
  • Who is Apollodoros?
  • What is the significance of the claim (5) that bankers kept track of (a) sums and dates of loans, (b) purpose of loans, (c) payments made on loans?
  • Just how badly in debt was Timotheus (11-13)?
  • The issue of the "military fund" is left unexpanded (11, 13). What is going on here?
  • What are the bowls 'worth' (31)?
  • What is the logic at paragraph 35?
  • Does the penultimate remark (68) remind you of anything we've seen recently?
• Dem. 34
  • Who is Phormio?
  • Can we make the math at 6-7 work?
  • What is 'security of twice that amount' (6)?
  • Who were the creditors pressing Phormio for the loan "for the single voiyage" (8)?
  • "So when the skipper told him to put on board the goods bought from my money..." (9). How is this possible? Phormio did not spend any of Chrysippus' money at Athens?
  • Who and how many died in paragraph 10? καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπεσώθη ἐν τῷ λέμβῳ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων παίδων τῶν Δίωνος, ἀπώλεσε δὲ πλέον ἢ τριάκοντα (τριακόσια MSS) σώματα ἐλεύθερα (om. MSS) χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων.
    

RUN TO GROUND: Two primary sources from from Cohen and/or passages (from wherever) that bear directly and interestingly on Dem 34 / 49

w5

02/06 - Banking 

• Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society ch. 5
  • From last time
    • [JF] On p. 71, Cohen states that free men did not work for others for an extended period of time. Other than independent craft or business, how would free citizens have survived? There was jury service, assembly (6,000 men, perhaps about 20% of the population), and armed forces. How else would they have made their money? Were there any other “welfare” or public maintenance funds available from the state? For the “incapacitated”?
    • [JF] On p. 88, Cohen asserts that “banking oikoi of slave origin signaled the rise of a new “mixed” Athenian establishment” which included metics, former slaves, naturalized citizens and the traditional elite. Cohen states that seven banking slaves were known to be enfranchised (88); would this be enough to dramatically change the composition of the aristocratic class? Would there be many enfranchised slaves of other occupations that would perhaps alter the composition of the class?
    • [JF] On p. 76, Cohen writes that Phormio entered into operating leases giving him complete control of Pasion’s bank and shield workshop. Since banking placed so much emphasis on the oikos and the kyrios, wouldn’t the leasing of a bank go against the interests of the banker? On p. 95, Cohen cites the possibility that bankers leased their banks to free themselves from the liability of the slaves’ contractual commitments. This sounds like it might be feasible—any other ideas?
  • For Chapter 5
    • [DG] On 115, Cohen writes,“In the absence of government regulations defining and limiting the placements that might be accepted by a bank, flexibility in terminology may be expected to accompany flexibility in the actual terms of deposit.” Would this necessarily be the case? It is a modern concern of having fixed terminology as far as government regulation is concerned, but for Athenians? Moreover, do they not already have a great deal of accuracy in vocabulary, as he seems behooved to prove in the case of yield? Also, at 159, he makes a big to do about not defining ekdosis. Is this not another issue of definition?
      
    • [DG] On 117, he reiterates that there were no witnesses at the initiation of the loan, but plenty at the repayment. However, there seem to have been contracts (eg, Dem. 34.31). Could we not consider this a form of "textual witness," as such contracts were admissable in court in lieu of witnesses? Also, on 119, he says there were no reciepts for bank deposits; were not records kept by banks receipts of a form? This whole business seems loose to me. What exactly is the role of text in Athenian banking? He says on 125 that it was a verbal business, but it seems there were at least 2 types of receipts, syngraphia and grammata.
    • [DG] What sort of logistics are involved in carrying around vast sums of money? was there a talent currency?
    • [DG] at 130, He refers to Pasion's debt to his own bank. Could this be his way of hiding his own monies? Is it really hiding money to invest/make loans, is that not just a way of not having liquid cash around, as your assets are involved in the loan process? Hence Bion, on 183. Is not aphanes economy money/holdings really just money that is not liquid, but invested, and aphanes a way of saying, "not on hand?"
    • [DG] 134-8: This whole business with the inheritance of Pasion is intriguing. What is the role of intermediaries in this business of purchasing land?
    • [DG] 141-3: Risk is inherent in the loan process. It is much like our current system, with cable news networks and their ilk reporting on investor confidence and stock fluctuations, bear/bull markets. I find it persuasive, but perhaps he is reading too much of the present?
    • [DG] On 150, Cohen talks about the importance of foreign currency. It makes perfect sense that Athenian monies were not useful elsewhere, regardless of their purity. We talked earlier about treasuries (Athena/Other Gods) having different types of currencies. Did they hold onto them for this very reason? Did banks ever ingage in loans/exchanges with the state treasuries?
    • [DG] Much of his evidence in this chapter, and throughout, comes from Isok. 17. Is he overusing it? Is this a methodological problem?
    • [DG] 170-83: It seems obvious that bankers were present in these cases, so why does he devote so much space to proving it? Why were previous analyses (i.e., Bogaert) so off the mark?
• Dem. 35
  
  • [DG] Phaselites sue a lot (§2); what legal grounds do foreigners hold to stand in Athenian courts? How does the issue of standing apply to ancient courts? [JDS: MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens 221-224; Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes 116-120; Harrison, The Law of Athens I 189-199]
  • In §6-8, we have a clear case of credit validation; why does he not seek redress from these men who vouched for Lacritus (if not monetarily, than socially [or is this case such an attack])? Can he?
  • [DG] §10-13 is the only surviving ancient contract. What is of interest to note?
  • [DG] §13: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ εἰσβάλωσι, [...] καὶ ἐντεῦθεν καταπλεύσαντες Ἀθήναζε τοὺς τόκους ἀποδόντων τοὺς πέρυσι γραφέντας εἰς τὴν συγγραφήν. What is the the deal πέρυσι refering to? Does this indicate a previous trading relationship between the two, or something else?
  • [JDS]: How do you understand paragraph 18: Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ γέγραπται ὅτι ἐπ’ οἴνου κεραμίοις τρισχιλίοις ἐδανείζοντο παρ’ ἡμῶν τὰς τριάκοντα μνᾶς, ὡς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς ὑποθήκης ἑτέρων τριάκοντα μνῶν, ὥστε εἰς τάλαντον ἀργυρίου τὴν τιμὴν εἶναι τοῦ οἴνου καθισταμένην, σὺν τοῖς ἀναλώμασιν, ὅσα ἔδει ἀναλίσκεσθαι εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τὴν περὶ τὸν οἶνον·.
  • [DG] There are 3 witnesses mentioned. If there were witnesses to this agreement and other loans, could not there also be witnesses then for certain banking transactions (cf, Cohen 117)?
  • [DG] There seems to be a lot of evidence against Lacritus; how persuasive do you think each of the different types of evidence were on the jury?
  • [DG] What is he talking about in §26? A metaphorical theft, a theft of security?
  • [DG] What scenarios might we provide where Lacritus is innocent of the charge?
  • [DG] Does it seems, in §36-38, that he treats money lent, and even the transitive wealth or potential, through staters, as his own?
  • [DG] The idea is floated in the introduction (131) that this is not actually Demosthenes. But, since it seems to be against a pupil of Isocrates (cf, §15 & 41-42), could this not be a set piece, a flagship private oration against a worthy adversary? Is his argument about assumption of debt by the brother convincing?
  • [JDS] Androcles demands that his opponents should prove (1) That they did not borrow the money, (2) that they borrowed and paid it back, (3) that trade contracts should not to be binding, (4) that it is right to use money otherwise than contract, or else take a hike. Does this tell us anything about standards of proof in emporic cases? Why such emphasis on sophistry?
• Dem. 33
  • [DG] There is a (relative) lack of documentary evidence in this speech; was an Athenian in court "innocent unitl proven guilty," or was it unnecessary for the prosecutor to absolutely prove his case, say if the defendent gives a poor defense?
  • [DG] §3: This is clearly a case concerned about standing (cf above, Dem. 35, point 1).
  • [DG] What is the process of arbitration as described in this case (§14ff.)? [JDS: MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens 203-211; Harrison, The Law of Athens II 64-68]
  • [DG] §18: Is this a potshot against the credibility of Eryxias, a personal feud in a public arena?
  • [DG] His whole point is that he has no contracts, but speeks primarily on the arbitration. Does this make his argumentation weak? What scenarios might proffer an interpretation wherein the speaker is lying, loses his case?

DISCUSSION CHAIR: DG

02/08 - Banking

• Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society ch. 6
  • The "underground" activity recently redeemed as a legitimate part of the functioning economy because of its "circumvention of of governmental inefficiencies or absurdities, ranging from counterproductive or repressive systems of taxation to restrictions on the free operation of commerce…" (p192). What about Athens' system is counterproductive or repressive?
  • [MM] Regarding Cohen's discussion of Theophemos and his attempts to collect money from a debtor by force (202): Cohen goes on to reiterate the important role that banks played in allowing debtors to avoid their creditors. But is it not probable that Theophemos was himself a banker? After all, Cohen has been telling us all along that banks' primary functions were essentially as creditors. And when the money you're lending is, as detailed last time, "someone else's," it seems that recovering lent monies should be of utmost importance to bankers. Does it not then seem odd that a bank's primary function should be to extend credit, but that one of its primary purposes should be to help people avoid reapying credit?
  • Unintended consequences / undirected developments / emergent properties:
    • Difficult to hide land--though done--and so land comes to be known as visible; relatively easy to hide intangible financial assets--though they could become visible--and so they came to be known as invisible
    • landed and maritime interest
    • impact of banks on money supply
    • lack of vertical integration / extreme fragmentation and risk management
    • oikos and banks
    • freedom from regulation
    • personal relationship with your banker
    • the banker is the bank
    • unavailable and undesirable
    • consolidation of maritime credit
    • 'taxation' and (non)disclosure
  • Direct action
    • Institution of apotimema, of symmories
    • dikai emporikai
    •  
• Dem. 27 (28-29 optional)
  • Q
• Finley, Ancient Economy ch.5-6
  • On business (p141): Antiquity “never created fiduciary money in any form, or negotiable instruments.” Money hoarded in ground or deposited in banks at no interest. Payments were made only in coin, not on books. Credit sales took form of fictitious loans and so are undetectable in evidence. Lenders were limited by cash on hand and so had no way to create credit with negotiable instruments. No more than 2 cases of loans for business purposes are attested, and these only bottomry; bottomry is the exception because these weren’t really loans but insurance; banks are hardly visible in bottomry. “Certainly there were transactions which have failed to creep into our sources, but the pattern of Greek moneylending for non-productive purposes is indubitable.” Thoughts?
  • Cicero borrowed from lenders to purchase a villa (Friends 5.6.2); Pliny reckoned he would call in loans and borrow from his mother in law (p142): “Whose behaviour was the more typical…?” We need further study, says Finley, but his opinion “is that among the Romans, too, large-scale brrowing, borrowing among the men of means, was for non-productive, consumers’ purposes,” including “loans for political ends.” How do these passages speak to consumption vs. production?
  • Under J. Caesar (p143): Tribunes lowered interest rates, lenders called in all their loans, debtors could not pay, land was seized and the market glutted, coin ran out. What does this say about bank money?
• Stray
  • Where does a state's wealth reside? Dem. 14.25-30.: Ὑπὲρ δὲ χρημάτων καὶ πόρου φανεροῦ τινὸς ἤδη παράδοξον μὲν οἶδα λόγον ὃν μέλλω λέγειν, ὅμως δ’ εἰρήσεται· πιστεύω γάρ, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς σκοπῇ, μόνος τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ γενησόμεν’ εἰρηκὼς φανεῖσθαι. ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι μὴ λέγειν νυνὶ περὶ χρημάτων· εἶναι γὰρ πόρον, ἂν δέῃ, μέγαν καὶ καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃν ἂν μὲν ἤδη ζητῶμεν, οὐδ’ εἰς τόθ’ ὑπάρχειν ἡγησόμεθ’ ἡμῖν· οὕτω πολὺ τοῦ πορίσαι νῦν ἀποσχήσομεν· ἐὰν δ’ ἐῶμεν, ἔσται. τίς οὖν ἔσθ’ οὗτος ὁ νῦν μὲν οὐκ ὤν, ὑπάρξων δ’ εἰς τότε; αἰνίγματι γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦτό γε. (25) ἐγὼ φράσω. ὁρᾶτε τὴν πόλιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πᾶσαν ταύτην. ἐν ταύτῃ χρήματ’ ἔνεστιν ὀλίγου δέω πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς ἄλλας εἰπεῖν πόλεις. ταῦτα δ’ οἱ κεκτημένοι τοιοῦτον ἔχουσι νοῦν ὥστ’, εἰ πάντες οἱ λέγοντες φοβοῖεν ὡς ἥξει βασιλεύς, ὡς πάρεστιν, ὡς οὐδ’ οἷόν τε ταῦτ’ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ μετὰ τῶν λεγόντων ἴσοι τὸ πλῆθος τούτοις χρησμῳδοῖεν, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἂν εἰσενέγκαιεν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἂν δόξειαν [οὐδ’ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν] κεκτῆσθαι. (26) εἰ μέντοι τὰ νῦν διὰ τῶν λόγων φοβερὰ ἔργῳ πραττόμεν’ αἴσθοιντο, οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἠλίθιός ἐστιν ὅστις οὐχὶ κἂν δοίη καὶ πρῶτος εἰσενέγκαι· τίς γὰρ αἱρήσεται μᾶλλον αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ ὄντ’ ἀπολωλέναι ἢ μέρος τῶν ὄντων ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰσενεγκεῖν; χρήματα μὲν δή φημ’ εἶναι τότε, ἂν ὡς ἀληθῶς δέῃ, πρότερον δ’ οὔ. διὸ μηδὲ ζητεῖν παραινῶ· ὅσα γὰρ νῦν πορίσαιτ’ ἄν, εἰ προέλοισθε πορίζειν, πλείων ἐστὶ γέλως τοῦ μηδενός. (27) φέρε γάρ, ἑκατοστήν τις εἰσφέρειν ἐρεῖ νῦν; οὐκοῦν ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα. ἀλλὰ πεντηκοστήν τις ἐρεῖ, τὸ διπλοῦν; οὐκοῦν ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι. καὶ τί τοῦτ’ ἔστι πρὸς διακοσίας καὶ χιλίας καμήλους, ἃς βασιλεῖ τὰ χρήματ’ ἄγειν φασὶν οὗτοι; ἀλλὰ θῶ βούλεσθε δωδεκάτην ἡμᾶς εἰσοίσειν, πεντακόσια τάλαντα; ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἂν ἀνάσχοισθε οὔτ’, εἰ καταθεῖτε, ἄξια τοῦ πολέμου τὰ χρήματα... The Persian king will fear our ships and resources. He will bring a lot of gold, but it will run out. By contrast, ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ τῆς χώρας τίμημ’ ὑπάρχον ἀφορμὴν.
  • [Arist.] AthPol 11.1: [Solon] βουλόμενος μήτε ταῦτα κινεῖν, μήτ’ ἀπεχθάνεσθαι παρών, ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσατο κατ’ ἐμπορίαν ἅμα καὶ θεωρίαν εἰς Αἴγυπτον; remember Isoc. 17.4: ἅμα κατ’ ἐμπορίαν καὶ κατὰ θεωρίαν.
• Previous questions worth (re)visiting?

• What is your take on the passage quoted (Finley 116) from Petronius (Sat. 53.3, at pp115-116): "in arcam relatum est, quod collocari non potuit, sestertium centies"?
• For Trimalchio et al. there were three places to put money, land, strong-box, short-term loans at interest; also a bit in ("a small fraction") "ships, urban house property, warehouses, slave-craftsmen and raw materials" (Finley 116). Responses?
• We see repeatedly in Finley that investment in land is first and foremost a moral gesture. Are there any other ways to look at it?
• Pliny Ep. 10.54-55 What is your take on the options presented by Pliny? Finley underscores (118): (1) the "familiar trinity, cash on hand, land, money on loan," (2) the fact that neither city nor emperor had a problem letting the cash sit idle, (3) the unavailability of land for purchase. How do you interpret this constellation of facts?

w6

02/13 - Real Estate

• Xen. Oec. Skim 1-19, but pay close attention from 20.1 to the end (Pomeroy).
  • [MM] I find the whole dialogue very inetersting for the fact that it demonstrates the various ways in which estate management, or alternately, "wealth management" was considered a science even in the 4th century. The portion of the opening chapter which concerns the disambiguation of "wealth" is fascinating, because it clearly shows that the ancients had a sophisticated understanding of the ways in which "property," "possessions," and "wealth" are interrelated, yet all different concepts.
  • [jds] 1.4: Wage labor? Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὴν τέχνην ταύτην ἐπισταμένῳ, καὶ εἰ μὴ αὐτὸς τύχοι χρήματα ἔχων, τὸν ἄλλου οἶκον οἰκονομοῦντα ὥσπερ καὶ οἰκοδομοῦντα μισθοφορεῖν; Νὴ Δία καὶ πολύν γε μισθόν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, φέροιτ’ ἄν, εἰ δύναιτο οἶκον παραλαβὼν τελεῖν τε ὅσα δεῖ καὶ περιουσίαν ποιῶν αὔξειν τὸν οἶκον.
  • [MM] 1.14: "Then money is to be kept at a distance, Critobulos, if one does not know how to use it, and not to be included in wealth." How does all of our previous reading, esp. Cohen, frame our understanding of this scentence, and what Socrates may be trying to say here? Credit dependency and the pervasive nature of banking-for-profit come to mind.
  • [MM] 1.16: Not entirely pertinent, but I can't help wondering if this is not a sly dig against Socrates himself. [jds] ἐκεῖνο δ’ ἡμῖν τί φαίνεται, ὁπόταν ὁρῶμέν τινας ἐπιστήμας μὲν ἔχοντας καὶ ἀφορμὰς ἀφ’ ὧν δύνανται ἐργαζόμενοι αὔξειν τοὺς οἴκους, αἰσθανώμεθα δὲ αὐτοὺς ταῦτα μὴ θέλοντας ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν ἀνωφελεῖς οὔσας αὐτοῖς τὰς ἐπιστήμας;
  • [MM] 2.6: What is the Greek word translated as "presidencies," and why does it entail the dispensation of personal income? The rest of the paragraph seems to cover liturgies, the trierarchy and eisphora, so I'm curious to know what is meant here. I would think this refers to the holding of public office, but why would this be personally expensive? Buying votes/support? Ideas? [jds] Ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὁρῶ σοι ἀνάγκην οὖσαν θύειν πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα, ἢ οὔτε θεοὺς οὔτε ἀνθρώπους οἶμαί σε ἂν ἀνασχέσθαι· ἔπειτα ξένους προσήκει σοι πολλοὺς δέχεσθαι, καὶ τούτους μεγλοπρεπῶς· ἔπειτα δὲ πολίτας δειπνίζειν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν, ἢ ἔρημον συμμάχων εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν αἰσθάνομαι τὰ μὲν ἤδη σοι προστάττουσαν μεγάλα τελεῖν, ἱπποτροφίας τε καὶ χορηγίας καὶ γυμνασιαρχίας καὶ προστατείας, ἂν δὲ δὴ πόλεμος γένηται, οἶδ’ ὅτι καὶ τριηραρχίας [μισθοὺς] εἰσφορὰς τοσαύτας σοι προστάξουσιν ὅσας σὺ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑποίσεις.
  • [MM] 5.7-5.13: I'm curious to know just how common it was for failed farmers, or poor peasants in general, to take to raiding fields for food even in peacetime. Not much is made of it, but surely it must have been a concern.
  • [MM] 6.12; 7.3: I would like to know what Greek word is being translated as "gentleman," and what implications this has. Why would Isomachos' enemies not want to call him a "gentleman" when bringing an antidosis against him? Wouldn't it be to their benefit to portray him as leisured and wealthy? Or does the term "gentleman" have negative financial connotations somehow? Still, this is an interesting concept: semantics as a battleground in financial litigation.
  • [MM] 7.15: What exactly constitutes "fair and honoroble means?" I would be inetersted to know how men like Isomachos felt about using banks as a way to hide their demonstrable wealth and avoid taxation. Was this considered "fair and honoroable?"
  • [MM] 11.22: It seems that keeping tabs on your neighbors was indeed a cardinal virtue.
  • [MM] 14.2: I wonder how often these slave "bailiffs" did in fact simply bolt with a chunk of their master's money or crops. If Isomachos gives special attention to teaching bailiffs "justice," this must have been a fairly frequent occurence.
  • [MM] 15.2: An interesting parellel to modern concepts of "trade secrets."
  • [MM] 17.9: Socrates seems here to support the basic principles of Athenian taxation. How does this affect our perception of the ideal "gentleman" (which his recollection of the interview with Isomachos seems to be setting forth), especially given Xenophon's noticeably plutocratic tendencies at other points in the dialogue?
  • [MM] 19.6: I'm curious from a purely logistical standpoint as to what sorts of tests did exist to distinguish "good" money from "bad" (which I assume means impure).
  • [MM] 20.1 ff: Does Isomachos' insistence that only effort separates success from failure in husbandry (as well as many other areas) make sense? It seems to me that this type of rhetoric is also quite popular today. Does his comment towards the end of the dialogue about "genius" being another necessity for success not seem to contradict this?
  • [MM] 20.22 ff: I found this section inetersting when considered through the lens of the "embedded" vs. "disembedded" economy debate. "Flipping" farmland demonstrates an understanding of many economic principles we would consider to be "modern," and shows a particular attention to nuanced valuation of property. This clearly supports a "disembedded" conception. And yet, the principle that husbandry was a skill instrinsic to all men, and that models for success in agriculture mimic models for success in other (more "social") fields seems to support an "embedded" conception. I'm taking one side or the other (I think we've all learned by now how silly that is), just pointing out what I find interesting.
  • [MM] Xenophon's clear admiration of Cyrus, and of the Persians in general, comes through quite obviously in this dialogue. To what extent should this affect our reception and analysis?
  • [MM] A personal jibe against business education: should business students really read humongous books on principles of managment, or should they just read this? Most of the dialogue is not so much about how to directly do things, but rather how to keep your lackies from screwing stuff up.
  • [MM] The above point leads me to point out that when Isomachos discusses husbandry as something which most men know intrinsically, we cannot forget that he is speaking of a very specific and small group. After all, women and slaves need to be rigorously taught the same things that appear to come naturally to "good" aristocrats. I swear there is something important in this observation, I just don't know what.
• Dem. 37
  • [MM] It seems to me that the whole mess of litigation and accusations could simply be the result of honest mistakes. After all, the "paper trail" associated with the financing, ownership and lease of the workshop and workmen is staggeringly complicated. Pantaenetus had obligations to Euergus and Nicobulus, but also to the so-called "creditors" and to the state. Nicobulus and Euergus had obligations (insofar as they were co-owners) to the "creditors," despite apparently not being aware of their existence at first. It makes the head spin, to be sure.
  • [MM] The status of slaves is of particular interest to me here. Pantaenetus charges that Nicobulus basically ordered his slave Antigenes to rob his (Pantaenetus') slave (among other things). Nicobulus' defense is that he was away from Athens when this is said to have happened. The editor's introduction posits that Nicobulus could have given his slave instructions prior to leaving, or told him to obey Eurgus in matters related to the workshop (Nicobulus suggests that Euergus took it upon himself to take charge of the slave). Or perhaps Antigenes defrauded Pantaenetus of his own accord. Did Nicobulus' being away discharge him of liability vis-à-vis Antigenes? He seems to suggest as much in his speech. Then there's the question of Pantaenetus' challenge at 40 to have Antigenes questioned. I find this somewhat supra-legal agreement to "settle out of court" on the basis of the slaves' questioning very inetersting. The editor assumes that torture is meant when the speaker talks about Mnesicles "assessing the value" of the slave. But is this necessarily the case? Total conjecture: maybe what is being implied is that even if the slave supports Nicobulus' version of events, Pantaenetus will still get the slave as compensation instead of the 2 talents. This might explain why Nicobulus describes the arrangement as being unfair to himself but more than fair to Pantaenetus. Again, pure conjecture. But conjecture is fun.
  • [MM] 33-34: why were heiresses afforded special legal recognizance? Why not lump offenses against them in with offenses against other female members of a citizen's household?
  • [MM] 37-38: I'm curious about how prosecution for "cutting through the limits" worked. Did the state itself not use any portion of the mines? If it did, how would it bring cases against citizens without public prosecutors? Or is the implication here that the state leased every square foot of the mines, and counted on lesees to prosecute each other for this offense?
  • [MM] 49: Do we know anything about the political implications of this "temporary disenfranchisement?" It seems that well-timed prosecution could cripple a rival's aspirations to office.
  • [MM] 51: The issue of liability and slaves gets very cloudy here. I'm still not entirely sure that I understand the distinctions Nicobulus is making.
  • [MM] 58-59: What Nicobulus says about homicide victims releasing their murderers from responsibility is intriguing. Could such a thing actually have existed? How could it be verified?
• Harris, "Apotimema"
  • [jds] Terms: prasis epi lysei, hypothêkê (hypothêke / hypetheto), apotimêma (apotiman / apotimasthai)
  • [MM] Harris' article tangentally brings up the issue of how legal guardianship worked in antiquity. Do we know much about this? Clearly it was an important consideration, or special legal procedures probably wouldn't exist to deal with orphans' property. Is this referring specifically to war orphans (who, I think, essentially became wards of the state), or to anyone whose legal guardian was not their parent? It's also made fuzzy as to who is benefitting from the income had from leasing orphans' property. Who gets the rent money? Did the concept of trusts exist in any way shape or form in antiquity?
  • [MM] 79: Why does the roof need to be specifically mentioned on the horos?
  • [MM] How might the blurring of leases versus loans affect our reading of Dem. 37? Furthermore, why is there no mention of apotimema in Dem. 37 (though we haven't read the Greek; maybe there is)?
  • [MM] 82: Wolff's idea of apotimema as something which protects the lessee from legal action in the event of default is intriguing, especially given Nicobulus' long discourse on legal release. It doesn't necessarily mean Wolff is right, but it's interesting.
  • [MM] 84: Why couldn't the same property being given as dowry be used as security against the dowry (I may be reading this wrong, but this idea seems to be what Harris is attributing to Wolff)? After all, as Harris himself says, people can't abscond with property or land. Consider also 90, where Harris talks about the dowry as a gift with no legal obligation attached.
  • [MM] 86: "The term employed to denote real security is timemati, the simplex form of the noun, which obviously has the same meaning as the compound." Really? Harris himself doesn't seem to believe this.
  • [MM] 90: In what ways might we consider Harris' analysis of the dowry system as demonstrating the lease of a woman? Essentially, I ask what is being more commodified, the dowry or the woman? The husband retaining legal rights over the dowry is contingent on his retaining legal rights of "use" over his wife, who in most ways was considered property herself. If the dowry is mostly considered a gift with no obligation attached, the legal significance of the transaction seems to shift to the wife herself, who is the most important piece of "property" in the arrangement.
  • [JF] On pps. 90-92, Harris argues that the reason why some dotal horoi had the term apotimema and some had the more specific language of loans was because Athenians were divided about the nature of the dowry—some thought it was a debt (the moment the man married, he fell into debt) and others thought that it was an asset. Harris concludes that in the few instances when the horoi had the specific language of loans, the husband must have viewed the dowry as a debt. Yet I ask, didn’t the father and not the husband set up the horoi (or at least choose what was to be inscribed)? Wouldn’t the father have viewed this dowry as contingent upon the husband and wife staying together, and thus not a loan? Why then would the father have wanted to use loan language? Would claiming the dowry as a loan benefit the father? Or would it be better to treat the dowry as a gift (contingent upon them staying together, of course), since the money would basically “disappear” (channeling Cohen here)? Could there be any other reason why the specific terms of loans were used in these few dotal cases?
  • [jds] Harpocration s.v. apotimêtai (Dindorf p.51): Ἀποτιμηταί καὶ Ἀποτίμημα καὶ καὶ τὰ ἀπ’ ατῶν. οἱ μισθούμενοι τοὺς τῶν ὀρφανῶν οἴκους παρὰ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐνέχυρα τῆς μισθώσεως παρείχοντο· ἔδει δὲ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐπιπέμπειν τινὰς ἀποτιμησομένους τὰ ἐνέχυρα. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐνέχυρα τὰ ἀποτιμώμενα ἐλέγοντο ἀποτιμήματα, οἱ δὲ πεμπόμενοι ἐπὶ τῷ ἀποτιμήσασθαι ἀποτιμηταὶ, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἀποτιμᾶν. εἰώθεσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ τότε, εἰ γυναικὶ γαμουμένῃ προῖκα διδοῖεν οἱ προσήκοντες, αἰτεῖν παρὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὥσπερ ἐνέχυρόν τι τῆς προικὸς ἄξιον, οἷον οἰκίαν ἢ χωρίον. ἐλέγετο δὲ ὁ μὲν δοὺς τὸ ἀποτίμημα ἐνεργητικῶς ἀποτιμᾶν, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν ἀποτιμᾶσθαι. ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀφλημάτων·
  • [jds] Pollux 8.142 (Bethe): ἐντιμήσασθαί ἐστιν, ὅταν τις προῖκα διδοὺς τιμήσηται ὁπόσου δεῖ· ἀποτίμημα δ’ ἐστὶν οἷον ὑποθήκη, κυρίως μὲν πρὸς τὴν προῖκα, ἤδη δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς μισθώσεις. καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἀποτιμήσασθαι. θεῖναι μὲν οἰκίαν ἐστὶ τὸ δοῦναι εἰς ὑποθήκην, θέσθαι δὲ τὸ λαβεῖν εἰς ὑποθήκην· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔθηκεν τὸ δ’ ἔθετο, καὶ ὁμοίως ὑπέθηκε καὶ ὑπέθετο. Ὑπερείδης δὲ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Χάρητα (fr 193 Bl) ἔφη ἀποδόμενος ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑποθείς.
• I bring to class: GHIII 36

DISCUSSION CHAIR: MM

02/15 - Funds

• Lys. 30
  • Ar. Ran. 1499-1514 (Pluto to Aeschylus): Ἄγε δὴ χαίρων, Αἰσχύλε, χώρει, / καὶ σῷζε πόλιν τὴν ἡμετέραν / γνώμαις ἀγαθαῖς, καὶ παίδευσον / τοὺς ἀνοήτους· πολλοὶ δ’ εἰσίν· / καὶ δὸς τουτὶ Κλεοφῶντι φέρων / καὶ τουτὶ τοῖσι πορισταῖς, / Μύρμηκί θ’ ὁμοῦ καὶ Νικομάχῳ / τόδε δ’ Ἀρχενόμῳ· καὶ φράζ’ αὐτοῖς / ταχέως ἥκειν ὡς ἐμὲ δευρὶ / καὶ μὴ μέλλειν· κἂν μὴ ταχέως / ἥκωσιν, ἐγὼ νὴ τὸν Ἀπόλλω / στίξας αὐτοὺς καὶ ξυμποδίσας / μετ’ Ἀδειμάντου τοῦ Λευκολόφου / κατὰ γῆς ταχέως ἀποπέμψω.
  • Ant. 6.49: Οὗτοι γὰρ ποίαν δίκην οὐ δικάσαιντ’ ἂν ἢ ποῖον δικαστήριον οὐκ ἐξαπατήσειαν ἢ τίνας ὅρκους οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν παραβαίνειν, οἵτινες καὶ νῦν τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν ποριστῶν καὶ τῶν πωλητῶν καὶ τῶν πρακτόρων καὶ τῶν ὑπογραμματέων οἳ τούτοις ὑπεγραμμάτευον, ἐξελάσαντές με ἐκ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου....
  • Dem. 4.33: ἂν ταῦτ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πορίσητε, τὰ χρήματα πρῶτον ἃ λέγω, εἶτα καὶ τἄλλα παρασκευάσαντες, τοὺς στρατιώτας, τὰς τριήρεις, τοὺς ἱππέας, ἐντελῆ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν νόμῳ κατακλείσητ’ ἐπὶ τῷ πολέμῳ μένειν, τῶν μὲν χρημάτων αὐτοὶ ταμίαι καὶ πορισταὶ γιγνόμενοι, τῶν δὲ πράξεων παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τὸν λόγον ζητοῦντες, παύσεσθ’ ἀεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν βουλευόμενοι καὶ πλέον οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες....
  • Lys. 30.2: ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ πατὴρ ὁ Νικομάχου δημόσιος ἦν, καὶ οἷα νέος ὢν οὗτος ἐπετήδευσε, καὶ ὅσα ἔτη γεγονὼς εἰς τοὺς φράτερας εἰσήχθη, πολὺ ἂν ἔργον εἴη λέγειν. 5-6: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐγγράφεις τὰ δ’ ἐξαλείφεις, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ὕβρεως ἥκεις ὥστε σαυτοῦ νομίζεις εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως, αὐτὸς δημόσιος ὤν. (6) ὑμᾶς τοίνυν χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἀναμνησθέντας καὶ τῶν προγόνων τῶν Νικομάχου, οἵτινες ἦσαν, καὶ οὗτος ὡς ἀχαρίστως ὑμῖν προσενήνεκται παρανομήσας, κολάσαι αὐτόν...; 27: ἀλλὰ τούτῳ γε προσήκει διὰ μὲν αὑτὸν τεθνάναι, διὰ δὲ τοὺς προγόνους πεπρᾶσθαι. ἀλλ’ ὡς, ἐὰν νῦν αὐτοῦ φείσησθε, αὖθις ἀποδώσει τὰς χάριτας; ὃς οὐδ’ ὧν πρότερον μετέλαβε παρ’ ὑμῶν ἀγαθῶν μέμνηται. καίτοι ἀντὶ μὲν δούλου πολίτης γεγένηται, ἀντὶ δὲ πτωχοῦ πλούσιος, ἀντὶ δὲ ὑπογραμματέως νομοθέτης.
• Xen. Por.
  • 3.2: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις ἐν μὲν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἀντιφορτίζεσθαί τι ἀνάγκη· νομίσμασι γὰρ οὐ χρησίμοις ἔξω χρῶνται· ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πλεῖστα μὲν ἔστιν ἀντεξάγειν ὧν ἂν δέωνται ἄνθρωποι, ἢν δὲ μὴ βούλωνται ἀντιφορτίζεσθαι, καὶ [οἱ] ἀργύριον ἐξάγοντες καλὴν ἐμπορίαν ἐξάγουσιν.
  • 3.6: Εἰς μὲν οὖν τὰς τοιαύτας αὐξήσεις τῶν προσόδων οὐδὲ προδαπανῆσαι δεῖ οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ψηφίσματά τε φιλάνθρωπα καὶ ἐπιμελείας. ὅσαι δ’ ἂν ἄλλαι δοκοῦσί μοι πρόσοδοι γίγνεσθαι, γιγνώσκω ὅτι ἀφορμῆς δεήσει εἰς αὐτάς.
  • [DG]: In 4.17, He estimates a need for 3 slaves for each citizen, οὕτω καὶ ἡ πόλις κτῷτο δημόσια ἀνδράποδα, ἕως γίγνοιτο τρία ἑκάστῳ Ἀθηναίων. In 4.24, He asserts a total revenue of 100 talents at a 10,000 man workforce, ὅταν δέ γε μύρια ἀναπληρωθῇ, ἑκατὸν τάλαντα ἡ πρόσοδος ἔσται. Does this mean that Xenophon reckons the citizenry at an extent of about 3,333?
  • [CA]: Supply and demand? Inflation? (4.6-4.10-) - "Mining is different from other industries... an increase in the amount of silver ore discovered and of the metal won is accompanied by an increase in the number of persons who take up the industry... when gold is plentiful, silver rises and gold falls in value." I still don't get this. Why does gold undergo inflation, but not silver? We see this so often throughout Greek history.
• [Arist. Oec. 2]
  • 1346b (13-19): Βυζάντιοι δὲ δεηθέντες χρημάτων τὰ τεμένη τὰ δημόσια ἀπέδοντο, τὰ μὲν κάρπιμα χρόνον τινά, τὰ δὲ ἄκαρπα ἀεννάως· τά τε θιασωτικὰ καὶ τὰ πατριωτικὰ ὡσαύτως· καὶ ὅσα ἐν χωρίοις ἰδιωτικοῖς ἦν· ὠνοῦντο γὰρ πολλοῦ ὧν ἦν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο κτῆμα· τοῖς δὲ θιασώταις ἕτερα χωρία, τὰ δημόσια ὅσα ἦν περὶ τὸ γυμνάσιον ἢ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἢ τὸν λιμένα·
  • 1347b(35)-1348a(3): Χῖοι δέ, νόμου ὄντος αὐτοῖς ἀπογράψασθαι τὰ χρέα εἰς τὸ δημόσιον, δεηθέντες χρημάτων ἐψηφίσαντο τοὺς ὀφείλοντας μὲν ἀποδοῦναι τῇ πόλει τὰ δάνεια, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐκ τῶν προσόδων τοὺς τόκους τοῖς δεδανεικόσι καταφέρειν, ἕως ἂν καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εὐπορήσωσιν.
  • [CA]: Something worth thinking about is that all of these anecdotes are individual instances and ad hoc, under duress actions whereby the leader (or in most cases the tyrant or king) needs a quick cash fix. There is no attention here to long term policies that would ensure a steady flow of revenue.
  • [CA]: In many of these cases we see here only the blatant use of coersion, employed by the sovereign power, to collect money and to avoid direct taxation - which would appear to be coercive and tyrannical (?).
  • [DG]: Note 1348b 22-32, the 2nd vignette about Clazomenae: "Ὀφείλοντές <τε> στρατιώταις μισθὸν εἴκοσι τάλαντα καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι, τόκον ἔφερον τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τέτταρα τάλαντα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχαίου ἀπέκοπτον οὐθέν, ἀεὶ δὲ μάτην ἐδαπάνων, νόμισμα ἔκοψαν σιδηροῦν εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον εἴκοσι ταλάντων, εἶτα διδόντες τοῖς εὐπορωτάτοις ἐν τῇ πόλει κατὰ λόγον ἑκάστῳ ἀργύριον παρ’ ἐκείνων ἔλαβον ἴσον. Οἵ τε οὖν ἰδιῶται εἶχον εἰς τὰς καθ’ ἡμέραν χρείας ἀναλίσκειν καὶ ἡ πόλις τοῦ χρέους ἀπηλλάγη. Δεύτερον δὲ ἐκ τῶν προσόδων ἐκείνοις τόν τε τόκον <ὃν> κατέφερον ἀεὶ διαιροῦντες ἑκάστῳ πρὸς μέρος διεδίδοσαν, τοὺς δὲ σιδηροῦς ἐκομίζοντο. Also, 1350a 23-30, the first of Timotheus of Athens, 1348a 32-35 with Dionysus of Syracuse, and perhaps 1349b 27-32. Are these early examples of fiduciary / fiat currency, used in times of emergency? Cohen says on 11, "Finley is correct in noting the complete absence at Athens of "unbacked fiat money," paper currency whose acceptance is mandated solely by government designation as 'legal tender.'" Though not paper, is this not a similar phenomenon described by [Arist]?

RUN TO GROUND: Two primary sources (from wherever) that bear directly and interestingly on Lys. 30 and/or Xen. Por. and/or [Arist.] Oec. 2

• Polyaenus III 9.30: Ἰφικράτης ἐν ἀπορίᾳ χρημάτων ἔπεισεν Ἀθηναίους τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἐς τὰς δημοσίας ὁδοὺς ἀποκόπτειν ἢ πιπράσκειν, ὥστε οἱ δεσπόται τῶν οἰκιῶν πολλὰ εἰσήνεγκαν χρήματα ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ περικοπῆναι καὶ σαθρὰ γενέσθαι τὰ οἰκοδομήματα. Cf. [Arist.] Oec. II 1347a (4-8): Ἱππίας Ἀθηναῖος τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τῶν ὑπερῴων εἰς τὰς δημοσίας ὁδοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀναβαθμοὺς καὶ τὰ προφράγματα καὶ τὰς θύρας τὰς ἀνοιγομένας ἔξω ἐπώλησεν· ὠνοῦντο οὖν ὧν ἦν τὰ κτήματα καὶ συνελέγη χρήματα οὕτω συχνά.

w7

02/20 - Lycurgan Athens

• Humphreys, "Lycurgus of Boutadai"
  • IG II² 337
  • IG II² 1623.276-308
  • IG II² 1629.Afront.a.217–232
  • IG II² 351
  • SEG XVI 55
  • IG II² 2496
  • [CP] "... the decision to give increased prominence in the Mystery cult to the god of the underworld under this name, etymologically suggesting ploutos, wealth, made explicit the promise of the Mysteries to promote agricultural fertility and individual well-being" (88). How much more explicit did this promise need to get? Why would Lycurgus have requisitioned all the builders and supplies to add something to the Mysteries that seems essentially redundant?
  • [CP] "Small cult groups of all kinds appear as sellers of property in a record of tax on land sales inscribed probably between 330 and 310" (100). I'm guessing the state bought most of these (though if not, then who?); how, then, were they maintained? Were they let back out to the phratries to run? Were they incorporated into some pan-Athenian park system? The cults' leasing of the sanctuary land to provide income for the sacrifices makes a lot more sense (to me, at least) than selling the land outright.
  • [CP] Why would Lycurgus' "ideology" have found little iconographic representation? (105)
  • [CP] "Lycurgus' use of eisangelia brings out particularly clearly the combination of democratic form and authoritarian content which characterizes his political style. ... Hyperides found it objectionable too and protested sharply against Lycurgus' use of eisangelia, hitherto reserved for serious political charges, against persons whom he considered immoral - cowards, adulterers, men who charged too highly for hired flute-girls" (106-7). Hyperides' defense of Euxenippos (to the charge brought by Polyeuktos, with Lycurgus singing backup) centers on the idea of a strict reading of the law: "or, being an orator, if he speaks contrary to the things beneficial to the Athenian people and receives payment for them" (Eux. 8). How much of the charge brought can be dropped on this technicality, if the charge is incorrectly brought at all? What, exactly, were the bounds of his role as "the guy who lies in the temple to get a dream from the god" (i.e. publicly speaking/declaring his dream) - and, possibly more to the point, did he receive anything in return for his service that would quality as "payment"?
• SEG XXVIII 103
  • [CP] So, unless I'm much mistaken, the second half of this is exactly the small cult activity described in Humphreys - renting out the sacred space to the highest bidder, who then swears not to lose all the money and to provide for the festival for Herakles. True?
  • [CP] The sequence of crowns given in the first half of the inscription is interesting, with abstract virtues rewarded to the greatest extent, followed by giving money and increasng state revenue.
• I.Oropos 297 AND 298 (here on paper, if you prefer, along with 296 if you are interested)
  • [CP] Here again occurs our good friend philotimia (297, l.11, 24; 298, l.15, 32). What sort of moral bent would the use of this word cast on the inscription and award, and how would that reflect upon Lycurgus' programme of social and financial reform?
• Hyp. Eux. 16-17
  • [CP] I suppose the obvious question here is "Whose mountain was it anyway?" What Hyperides says makes a lot of sense, particularly in his assessment of the contradictions within the flawed decree. Also, how often did tribes pay out to other tribes when the recipient-tribes were wronged?
  • [CP] How common were the poorly-formed decrees and subsequent fines?
  • paragr. 37: ἔστι γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρ[ες δι]κασταί, οὐχ οὗτος [χρη]στὸς πολίτης, ὅ[στις] μικρὰ δοὺς πλείω βλάπτει τὰ κοινά, οὐδ᾽ ὅστις εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἐξ ἀδίκου πορίσας κατέλυσε τῆς πόλεως τὴν ἐκ δικαίου πρόσοδον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτῳ μέλει καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὠφελίμων τῇ πόλει καὶ τῆς ὁμονοίας τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑμετέρας: ὧν ἔνιοι οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐργαζομένων ἀφαιρούμενοι πόρους φασὶ τούτους πορίζειν, ἀπορίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει παρασκευάζοντες. ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ φοβερὸν τὸ κτᾶσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, τίς βουλήσεται κινδυνεύειν.
• Agora XIX L8
  • [CP] This certainly seems to confirm Hyperides' assertion that Oropos was divided up and managed by each of the demes, though Hyperides says "mountains" instead of "arable lands" or even "forests." Does anyone have a topographical map of the area?

DISCUSSION CHAIR: CP

02/22 - Agriculture

• Foxhall, Olive Cultivation in Ancient Greece ch. 1-3

w8

02/27 - Coinage and Money

• Bresson, "Coinage and Money Supply"
  • [JF] On p. 44, Bresson states that “in Classical antiquity, money primarily meant coined silver or gold”. Throughout the paper, Bresson does not seem to take into account the role of credit (granted his paper is on coins, but still). Can we exclude credit money from this? Did banks and credit fall out of favor in the Hellenistic world?
  • [JF] Bresson writes (46) that “whatever its timing, a decision to mint presupposed a prior policy of accumulation, on the part of the state, of coined or uncoined metal, which would have begun many years before an actual minting took place”. This is really interesting to me. How long would this take? How did they go about accumulating? How did they fill the vacuum left by the gathering of coin and metal?
  • [JF] What sort of institutional infrastructure was set up for the gathering, refining and keeping precious metals secure? Was it a well-oiled machine? How different would it have been in the kingdoms as opposed to the polis. I am thinking about Athens here and how hands off they were in so many situations. (47)
  • [JF] On p. 51, Bresson writes that “as far as output is concerned, most issues were not intended to facilitate exchange as such, but to provide cash for the immediate needs of the state”. Does this imply that there was no foresight? I thought that there needed to be much time to provision a new mint? Or was there just always a constant influx of metal?
  • [JF] On pps 55-56, Bresson asserts that “compared to modern times, production (mainly agriculture) could absorb only a low level of investment…this was why there was no awareness that an increase in the money supply could lead to general “economic growth”. I understand that agriculture is the main unit of production, but surely there were other means of production that required consistent investment? Silver mines? The more investment, the more silver could be produced.
  • [JF] The Seleukids and Antigonids may have struck 2-3% per annum, mainly to keep up with attrition. What about hoarding? (57)
  • [JF] Bresson states that “countermarking operations or the introduction of closed currency systems, may have provided a better framework for achieving an estimate of coinage in circulation” (59). What exactly is countermarking and what is its benefit? Who used it?
  • [JF] So people are still hiding money in the third century BC, even if it is cold hard cash? Inscription from Teos (2nd half of 3rd c) indicates that “forced by a piractical attack to buy back people who had been kidnapped, the city enjoined that all citizens should declare their precious possessions…it appears that false declarations were a matter of concern. The character of the text shows that such inventories were not a usual practice and raises the problem of declarations of aphanes ousia” (58).
  • [JF] Bresson states (58) that cities (as opposed to kingdoms) on rare occasions give us an understanding of the amount of coin in circulation. From Plutarch we find out what is found in reserve in Rhodes in 43BC, but how is this an example of all coin in circulation in Rhodes?
  • [JF] How would a city recuperate when it lost a massive amount of coin in war?
  • [JF] What recourse did a polis have if the city could not obtain silver (the supply of which was dwindling with the years)? Was there ever an instance that a polis completely ran out? Did the city borrow it from elsewhere or revert to payment in kind?
  • [JF] The mass of coins introduced by Alexander’s conquest multiplied the amount of money in circulation many times over. Bresson states that we must keep in mind that there was a far wider distribution now and new coins may have been hoarded immediately (59). But apart from these two factors, surely this influx must have had a significant effect on the market? Do we have any evidence of its effect?
  • [JF] How much of a phenomenon was hoarding? How do we know how much was hoarded and how it would affect markets?

• Sosin, "Alexanders and Stephanephoroi at Delphi"
  • [JF] Is it unusual that Delphi would have gone so far afield for an endowment?
  • [JF] Were endowments usually made without any stipulations from the grantor? Would this be in their best interests? Would the grantor have to agree with the stipulations? Or did the city have free reign?
  • [JF] If Attalos II merely sent the endowment and allowed a handful of rich citizens to establish the terms under which it could be borrowed (foreign capital with no agio, limited to the few and wealthy), why would the rich at Delphi be unique in their legislative savvy and their desire for profit? Would this not have happened elsewhere (such a low interest rate, no agio)? Was perhaps Attalos not only generous but also extremely “hands-off” in his endowment, something that others grantors tended not to do? Are there any other examples of states being endowed and crafting their own legislation on how it can be borrowed?
  • [JF] What was the standard currency in Attalid kingdom? Obviously cistophoroi, but was there any other domininant Attalid currency? How common would the Alexanders have been? Who would have stipulated that the endowment be in Alexander drachmas, the wealthy of Delphi or Attalos? If the few wealthy men had demanded Alexanders would it have been a hassle for Attalos to supply them?
  • [JF] What sort of business would the wealthy use the foreign capital for? Trade?
  • [JF] Why would Attalos have made the endowment? What benefit did Attalos get from the endowment? Any monetary gain? Or just the honor?
  • [JF] Who were the Athenian minting authorities? Under whose power did they fall? Public or private? (199)
  • [JF] Would the loss of “respect” and status of Attic coinage have been sufficiently made up by the enhanced revenues? Why would Athens have taken this route? (199)
  • [JF] How often did the Amphictyons make decrees about coinage? Was this something they did often? Did their decrees always pertain to the whole Greek world?
  • [JF] If the Athenians were going to overvaluate the stephanephoroi, why would they have done it by so little? If the integrity of the coin was diminished anyway, would they not have overvalued it further? Did this happen later?
  • [JF] Did the other overvalued coins like the symmachic silver and cistophoroi suffer in the markets b/c they were overvalued? Or did it strengthen their role?
  • [JF] What was the anchor of the stephanephoroi?
  • [JF] Would this have been the first instance of a lawful overvaluation over the entire Greek world? Would the cistophoroi and symmachic silver lose their value once they traveled outside the issuing authority’s reach? How far were these two coinages recognized? Were they recognized across the Greek world or just in certain cities and kingdoms?
• idem, "Boeotian Silver, Theban Agio and Bronze Drachmas"
  • [JF] Let me try and get this straight: the Boeotians struck a new coin on a reduced Aeginetan standard, the symmachikon: when Pompidas paid his calvarymen in symmachikon he weighed it out in accordance to the old weight-standard, the Aeginetan—now known locally as Boeotian? I can understand why they wanted to weigh it to the old standard, but why would they not have just kept its old name, “Aeginetan”?
  • [JF] So did the old Aeginetan standard fall completely out of circulation, overtaken by the symmachikon?
  • [JF] How much would the exchange market have fluctuated (338)? Would it have been similar to the modern exchange rate? Would there have been a wide fluctuation, say as with the dollar now?
  • [JF] Do we know what compelled Boeotia to introduce the new bronze coinage and change the standard of their silver coins at this time? Was there a scarcity of silver? Were they in a bad political or financial situation, which required dramatic reform?
• idem, "Agio at Delphi"
  • [JF] Would Marchetti’s “ré-(ἐπι-)-évaluation” have been applied just to the exchange-rate between Aeginetan and Attic silver? Agio was applied to all currencies; why would Marchetti think that Dephi would have its own definition of ἐπικαταλλαγή separate from its usual meaning (agio) in the rest of Greece?
  • [JF] Would Delphi have had that big of a problem with worn coins? Surely in a polis as large as Delphi, new coins would be constantly minted (and indeed were worn coins being constantly remelted?)? Why would they want to seemingly cut the value of their coins by this revaluation? Was there no other recourse they could have taken?
  • [JF] How did poleis usually deal with worn coins? How long must a coin be in circulation before it starting losing its weight from wear?
  • [JF] Marchetti published this argument in 1988 and apparently enjoyed support until 2000. Josh seems to have convincingly overturned every part of Marchetti’s argument. Does anyone still support Marchetti’s theory

• Coin stuff
  • Manufacture / Die links
  • Cyzicene stater / another / another
  • Steph: ANS 1963.31.232 | 1963.31.269 | 1944.100.24621 (search: "Athens+wreath")
  • ANS: Athens
  • ANS: cistophorus
  • ANS: Alexander
  • ANS: Lysimachus
  • ANS: Ptolemy
  • ANS: Seleucus
  • ANS: Philetaerus
  • ANS: Demetrius
  • ANS: Antiochus
  • ANS: Bactria

DISCUSSION CHAIR: JF

02/29 - War

• Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World ch.7 25pp
  • CA: Back to Thucydides: from what we've read about piracy, is Thucydides wrong in his Archaeology where he portrays piracy as a low ebb in the cyclical development of the Greek world?
  • CA: 138: "The Hellenistic world was as close as an economic system comes to our notion of globalization." Are statements like this really useful?
• V. Gabrielsen, "Economic Activity, Maritime Trade and Piracy in the Hellenistic Aegean," REA 103 (2001) 219-240
  • [MM] Gabrielsen seems entirely unwilling to entertain the idea that prostatai "acquiring customers" was extortion plain and simple. He insists that the states offering protection were engaged in a business and were legitimately concerned with their reputation as providers of a service. Perhaps I'm just too much of cynic, but is this really plausible? Extortion seems much more likley to me. The underlying message large states send when taking money for maritime protection seems to be something along the lines of "pay us to protect you from leisteia, or we'll leizometha the holy bejeezus out of you." This makes sense if we remember what Gabrielsen says about the "raid mentality." The coastal states who would be the "customers" of the prostatai would all be more likely to retain and understand the "raid mentality," and probably wouldn't need protection from small private raiding operations, since they'd have the know-how to deal with these. They would, however need protection from naval forces as large as those of the prostatai. Consider Demosthenes 8.24-25: we are told that "generals with one or two ships raise less; those with a larger fleet raise more." Gabrielsen doesn't really ponder this statement, but he should. The best reason I can think of for why this would be so is that "customers" would be more likely to buy the services of prostatai when they were staring at a gigantic mass of warships ready to pummel them to no end. However, I don't want to suggest that there was no element of protection in what prostatai did, but it seems most likely that they protected their customers from other prostatai more than from "pirates" (though what distinctions can really be drawn between the two, I don't know)

RUN TO GROUND: Two inscriptions from Chaniotis and/or Gabrielsen

w9

• L. Migeotte, L'Emprunt public, 9, 11, 19, 45 (note generalities, not details), 62, 79, 96, 97
  • [JDS]: But weren't we supposed to think that states didn't lend states money?
  • 9 = I.Oropos 303
    • [JDS]: What does this tell us about credit? availability, competition, role of citizens/foreigners in?
  • 11 Chorsiai
  • 19 Argos
  • 45 Delos
  • 62 Paros
  • 79 = I.Ilion 1
  • 96 = Milet I.3 138
    • [JDS]: What can this text tell us about the nature and operation of the state bank?
    • [JDS]: Does this mechanism sound familiar in any way?
  • 97 = Milet 1.3 147
    • [JDS]: What does the rider (69-77) do?
• Astynomoi inscription
  • [JDS]: P.Hal. 1 sections 4, 5
  • [JDS]: What does this tell us about the categories "public" and "private" in ancient economic and political thought?
  • [JDS]: What is the economic story in this legislative gesture?
• Selections from Austin
  • [DR] I found Polybius’ comments at the end of the passage about the earthquake at Rhodes somewhat curious. It seems as though he considers the numerous contributions from the other cities to have been in some way squandered by the Rhodians. Did the Rhodians “fall somewhat short of expectations,” in that they were not able to regain the level of power as prostatai? How in fact did they fall short? For we know that seven years after the earthquake they were able to exert their authority over Byzantium.
  • [DR] There seems to have been a plethora of extremely rich men roaming around Hellenistic Greece who were capable of bank-rolling large portions of their city’s budget entirely on their own. Were these men in any way (forcefully) compelled to help out their city? Certainly it corresponded with their personal interests to help keep the city safe and prosperous, but at what point do they tell the city to ask someone else for help? Did they not feel they were being taken advantage of? Did it matter to them? Perhaps more importantly, in what manner was the city being so poorly mismanaged that it was forced to seek out assistance from individuals? Or, was this not at all a matter or mismanagement, but rather the m.o. of the Hellenistic city?
  • [DR] The gymnasium was capable of dispensing a variety of fines to its patrons. Certainly these fines would help to fund the daily budget expenses of the gymnasium in supplement to money allotted by the city. In times of financial distress, however, could not these fines have been abused in order to secure the gymnasium’s income? The gymnasiarch could easily fabricate such accusations, and may even have been inclined to do so in order to secure his salary.
  • [DR] A number of the inscriptions give instances of a city loaning out money to other cities. Obviously such actions reflect in either a positive or negative manner the disposition of one city towards another, and constitute a Hellenist brand of “foreign policy.” But what implications did such loans have on a city’s determination to help (or not to help) a city in need of military support?
  • [DG] 97: What does this mean (B139): After spending for both walls 1,500 gold pieces and having paid most of this sum, he received back copper coins for 400 gold pieces." What kind of gold pieces? copper coins?
  • [JDS] 97: so how much did grain cost at Olbia in time of shortage?
  • [JDS] 100: Does this look like ordinary or emergency finance? Does it matter?
  • [JDS] 101: Whom does Oropos target for funding? Does this say anything about availability of local funds?
  • [DG] 104: What is the impetus behind putting so long a text onto stone? I can see the rationale behind having it posted publically, but wouldn't its use fade after a couple of years? In the Roman period, there were alba, which were painted boards, which display such things on wood with paint (I believe); why wouldn't they use a similar strategy? Perhaps to show their power and wealth?
  • [JDS] 105: Why ban accepting silver obols? Why ban selling in exchage for grain?
  • [DG] 106: What was the sacred property they stole? the dies punishable by death?
  • [DG] 109: Why is this necessary? An early form of price controls?
  • [JDS] 110, lines 15-20 (on wage laborers and their bosses): have we seen anything like this before? Do you think his refers to a specific episode or to general conditions?
  • [DG] 111: in 14, when it says that the fine is to be consecrated to Demeter and Core, does that mean that they protected the weights and measures? Later, 30-44: How do you think these scales were constructed, how many were made, how were they used?
  • [JDS] 111, section IV:
    • 1-Commercial-mina wt. = 138 stephanephoric dr. + 12 steph.dr. = 150 steph.dr.
    • 5-Commercial-mina wt. = 5 commercial M + 1 commercial mina = 6 commercial minas
    • 1-Commercial-talent wt. = 1 commercial T (=60 comm. minas?) + 5 comm. minas = 1 comm. T and 5 comm. M
    • Can anyone make sense of the numbers? Why are the ratios not equal across the three?
  • [JDS] 112: So how much was grain selling at Ephesus in time of shortage?
  • [JDS] 115: Histiaian grain commissioners sent to Delos ... Rhodian guy doing who knows what on Delos ... a Histiaian decree posted publically on Delos... Write the novel; what was going on here.
  • [JDS] 116: What was the purpose of this mechanism? It is presented with a string of texts apparently concerning shortage. Does it address the same?
  • [JDS] 118: What is the state's financial role in administration of the gymnasium?
  • [JDS] 119: What can this text tell us about the nature and operation of the state bank?
  • [DG] 119/120: What consisted of public education? We have a couple of professions (flute girl, drill instructor, gymnast) , but what else was taught? Who was recieving this public education? When did this practice start, was usual in the Roman world? What were the consequences of this socialized education?
• IGLS IV 1264: PHI
  • [JDS] What does this tell us about connections between civic economies, religion, law?
  • [JDS] What is the economic story in this episode?

DISCUSSION CHAIR: DR

03/07 - Taxes

• Badian, Publicans and Sinners (ch.1-3 ch.4-6 notes and index)
  • [DG] How do we define publicani? Is it a social class, status (Finley)? Is it a permanent classification? Maybe a business classification? How would they define themselves?
  • [DG] 28-30: This doesn't make any sense to me; why do soldiers need togas? Boatwright (personal communication) thinks that there was no reason for a soldier to have a toga in the Republic. What does this say of the passage?
  • [DG] passim: What is the political expediency of having the censor as contract negotiator? exactly how much control did they have, esp. independent of the Senate?
  • [DG] 73-4: What should we make of his definition of the decumanus (only attested once?) what would be the utility of having a "Senate of the Publicani?" PAC?
  • [DG] is there any value in comparing the role of the publicani with proeisphora?
  • [DG] What is the interplay between Publicani and Equites? Does not Cicero, where the evidence mainly comes from, often blur these things for effect? There cannot be a one to one ratio, but it seems sometimes (like in his discussion of the Verrines) the author equates the two groups in this way.
• I.Oropos308
• Some selections on publicans; see esp. CIL I² 698 at end.
  • [DG] 461, CXXXIII: Whatdoes this say about the privlidges of women? "They shall obey the laws of the Colonia [...] and shall enjoy in good faith [...] all such rights as specified."

w10

03/12 - Spring Break

w11

03/19 - Banking and Business

• Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World ch.1-12
  • [DG] Ch 2. Wanted to make sure I got the terms right. Andreau distinguishes 6 (major) non-exclusive classes of money operations:
    • fenatores: specialist lenders for interest
    • negotiaories: fund managers, made funds bring a profit
    • lending intermediaries
    • procurators: managed patrimonies for paterfamilias
    • nummularii: private money changers
    • publicani: tax collectors / money transfers
  • [DG] So, big question: in ch 3, Andreau discusses Roman banks. What are the big differences between the Roman and Greek systems? He is clearly a reader of Cohen (40): what is the influence of Cohen over this work?
  • [DG] Ch 5, 68-70: What do we think of his explanation of peculium? The way he describes it, it reminds me of partitioning a hard-drive: quasi-patrimony (69)?
  • [DG] Ch 7: Does anyone else think that these tesserae nummulariae are really cool sounding? This is a picture I quickly found. Does his explanation seem plausible?
  • [jds] pp3-5: what is the significance of the attention to "work status"? Where have we seen this before?
  • [jds] p4: "The members of the elite saw money in relation to their patrimony. For them, it was either a substitute for a patrimony or else an income from it. Psychologically, then, it did not function as capital--even when, in the economic process, in effect it did operate precisely as that." Here and throughout we see an emphasis on 'patrimony'. Why? Is it a useful focus?
    
  • [jds] pp64-70: on slave managers, how does the portrait look limilar to / different from Cohen's Athens, legally, socially (see also pp47-49), economically?
  • [jds] pp60-61: on banking/business and family/status/movement (Horace, Trimalchio, Vespasian); what looks familiar in this account? what looks different?
  • [jds] pp71-79: TPSulp. 69 | 74 | 85 | 52 and 45 | 78 | 63 | 53 and drawing of the same | |
  • [jds] pp90-99: How does the band of attested interest rates differ from what we have seen in 4th-2nd c. Athens and Aegean?
  • [jds] p103: In the crisis of 64/3, what seems to be the relationship between debt and land?
  • [jds] pp103-104: crisis of 49: "Because of this war, many creditors needed to recall their funds." Why? "But the debtors were not in a position to repay them immediately, as they were unable to sell their own properties (and clearly did not wish to)." Selling was their first resort? The lack of cash led to a rise in land prices. By what mechanism?
  • [jds] p104: Situation in 49 was the opposite from that seen in 64/3. Sure, but what are the similarities? Are these important?
  • [jds] pp104-105: crisis of AD 33. Caesar's legislation did (or probably did) 2 things: (1) fix a minimum fraction of patrimony that had to be possessed in Italy, (2) probably fixed a maximum fraction of partimony that could be lent. Apparent goal was debt-regulation. What would the logic have been?
  • [jds] p104-105: Under Tiberius, 2/3-landowning rule revived. Apparent purpose to prop up land prices since with low prices debotrs could not pay debts. Meanwhile, sale of confiscated wealth moved private money from private hands to the fisc. This plus "payment crisis" contributed to collapse of land prices. Emperor offered interest-free loans, all secured against real estate, which restored confidence and fixed the problem. Does all of this make sense? Again, what is the relationship between land and credit?
  • [jds] pp132-138: How is the history of Roman bankers the history of Rome writ small?

03/21 - Agoranomos and Muhtasib: What is the Relationship?

DISCUSSION CHAIR [JM]

• As you read over the material discussing the agoranomos, the agoranomos/aedile, the Byzantine eparch, and finally the muhtasib, what is the picture that you see? (This question is for everyone, and there is no 'right' answer, at least not that I can see at present.)
• Do the sources show us a coherent institution passed down from one age to another? Is there a direct line of ascent/descent linking the agoranomos at one end with the muhtasib at the other, or does each represent a wholly separate institution similar to the other only by virtue of their having been created to inhabit a more or less static environment (the ancient marketplace)? (I realize I am laying out extreme positions here; the reality may be somewhere between; feel free to respond by pointing this out. If you can go further and make an argument that 'maps the middleterrain,' I will be very eager to hear it, and I do not mean that Socratically.)
• Whether you end up seeing the relationship between the agoranomos and the muhtasib as accidental or genetic (to continue the biological metaphor), I think it would help everyone (me most of all, I admit), if each one of us took a moment to come up with viable arguments for both views (nuanced as necessary; tailor your arguments to fit the evidence as you read it). This will give us something to share in class, and help me write a better paper. Thanks in advance for all your thought and comments.
• [MM] Regarding Sperber: I admittedly don't know what the linguistic basis is for Sperber's assertion that all of his sources in Rabbinical literature are talking about the same magistrate, but I still find it somewhat odd that it seems like not two of the sources he brings forth use the same word to describe said magistrate. In the notes on Leviticus Rabba 1.8 he offhandedly dismisses Ben-David's rendering of "city-agronomos," which might suggest the possibility that different levels of government all had their own agronomoi. This might explain why so many different titles are used when describing magistracies that carry the same basic functions. It makes sense that several officials, some of them from the local government, some from the provincial government, some perhaps as agents of the religious authority in Palestine (especially when dealing with goods which might have religious significance) might all have had some authority to inspect goods, and have a vested interest in the workings of the market.
• [jds] Σ Il. 21.203: καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀγορανομικῷ δὲ νόμῳ Ἀθηναίων διέσταλται ἰχθύων καὶ ἐγχελύων τέλη.
• [jds] decree on Athenian agoranomoi: IG II² 380
• [jds] Aristoph. Ach. 718–728: Ὅροι μὲν ἀγορᾶς εἰσιν οἵδε τῆς ἐμῆς. / Ἐνταῦθ’ ἀγοράζειν πᾶσι Πελοποννησίοις / ἔξεστι καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ Βοιωτίοις, / ἐφ’ ᾧτε πωλεῖν πρὸς ἐμέ, Λαμάχῳ δὲ μή. / Ἀγορανόμους δὲ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καθίσταμαι / τρεῖς τοὺς λαχόντας τούσδ’ ἱμάντας ἐκ Λεπρῶν. / Ἐνταῦθα μήτε συκοφάντης εἰσίτω / μήτ’ ἄλλος ὅστις Φασιανός ἐστ’ ἀνήρ. / Ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν στήλην καθ’ ἣν ἐσπεισάμην / μέτειμ’, ἵνα στήσω φανερὰν ἐν τἀγορᾷ.
• [jds] AthPol 50 … κληροῦνται δὲ καὶ ἱερῶν ἐπισκευασταὶ δέκα ἄνδρες, οἳ λαμβάνοντες τριάκοντα μνᾶς παρὰ τῶν ἀποδεκτῶν ἐπισκευάζουσιν τὰ μάλιστα δεόμενα τῶν ἱερῶν·
  
  [2] καὶ ἀστυνόμοι δέκα. τούτων δὲ ε’ μὲν ἄρχουσιν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, πέντε δ’ ἐν ἄστει, καὶ τάς τε αὐλητρίδας καὶ τὰς ψαλτρίας καὶ τὰς κιθαριστρίας οὗτοι σκοποῦσιν, ὅπως μὴ πλείονος ἢ δυεῖν δραχμαῖν μισθωθήσονται, κἂν πλείους τὴν αὐτὴν σπουδάζωσι λαβεῖν, οὗτοι διακληροῦσι καὶ τῷ λαχόντι μισθοῦσιν. καὶ ὅπως τῶν κοπρολόγων μηδεὶς ἐντὸς ι’ σταδίων τοῦ τείχους καταβαλεῖ κόπρον ἐπιμελοῦνται. καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς κωλύουσι κατοικοδομεῖν, καὶ δρυφάκτους ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁδῶν ὑπερτείνειν, καὶ ὀχετοὺς μετεώρους εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν ἔκρουν ἔχοντας ποιεῖν, καὶ τὰς θυρίδας εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν ἀνοίγειν. καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἀπογιγνομένους ἀναιροῦσιν, ἔχοντες δημοσίους ὑπηρέτας.
  
  [51] Κληροῦνται δὲ καὶ ἀγορανόμοι <ι’>, πέντε μὲν εἰς Πειραιέα, ε’ δ’ εἰς ἄστυ. τούτοις δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων προστέτακται τῶν ὠνίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πάντων, ὅπως καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκίβδηλα πωλήσεται.
  
  [2] κληροῦνται δὲ καὶ μετρονόμοι <ι’>, πέντε μὲν εἰς ἄστυ, ε’ δὲ εἰς Πειραιέα. καὶ οὗτοι τῶν μέτρων καὶ τῶν σταθμῶν ἐπιμελοῦνται πάντων, ὅπως οἱ πωλοῦντες χρήσονται δικαίοις.
  
  [3] ἦσαν δὲ καὶ σιτοφύλακες κληρωτοὶ <ι’>, πέντε μὲν εἰς Πειραιέα, πέντε δ’ εἰς ἄστυ, νῦν δ’ εἴκοσι μὲν εἰς ἄστυ, πεντεκαίδεκα δ’ εἰς Πειραιέα. οὗτοι δ’ ἐπιμελοῦνται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅπως ὁ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σῖτος ἀργὸς ὤνιος ἔσται δικαίως, ἔπειθ’ ὅπως οἵ τε μυλωθροὶ πρὸς τὰς τιμὰς τῶν κριθῶν τὰ ἄλφιτα πωλήσουσιν, καὶ οἱ ἀρτοπῶλαι πρὸς τὰς τιμὰς τῶν πυρῶν τοὺς ἄρτους, καὶ τὸν σταθμὸν ἄγοντας ὅσον ἂν οὗτοι τάξωσιν. ὁ γὰρ νόμος τούτους κελεύει τάττειν.
  
  [4] ἐμπορίου δ’ ἐπιμελητὰς δέκα κληροῦσιν· τούτοις δὲ προστέτακται τῶν τ’ ἐμπορίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦ σίτου τοῦ καταπλέοντος εἰς τὸ σιτικὸν ἐμπόριον τὰ δύο μέρη τοὺς ἐμπόρους ἀναγκάζειν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ κομίζειν.
  
  [52] Καθ[ισ]τᾶσι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἕνδεκα κλήρῳ, τοὺς ἐπιμελησομένους τῶν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρ[ί]ῳ, καὶ τοὺς ἀπαγομένους κλέπτας καὶ τοὺς ἀνδραποδιστὰς καὶ τοὺς λωποδύτας, ἂν μὲν [ὁμολογῶ]σι, θανάτῳ ζημιώσοντας, ἂν δ’ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, εἰσάξοντας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, κἂν μὲν ἀποφύγωσιν, ἀφήσοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τότε θανατώσοντας, καὶ τὰ ἀπογραφόμενα χωρία καὶ οἰκίας εἰσάξοντας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ τὰ δόξαντα δ[ημ]όσια εἶναι παραδώσοντας τοῖς πωληταῖς, καὶ τὰς ἐνδείξεις εἰσάξοντας· καὶ γὰρ ταύτας εἰσάγουσιν οἱ ἕνδεκα. εἰσάγουσι δὲ τῶν ἐνδείξεών τινας καὶ οἱ θεσμοθέται.
  
  [2] κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ εἰσαγωγέας ε’ ἄνδρας, οἳ τὰς ἐμμήνους εἰσάγουσι δίκας, δυοῖν φυλαῖν ἕκαστος. εἰσὶ δ’ ἔμμηνοι προικός, ἐάν τις ὀφείλων μὴ ἀποδῷ, κἄν τις ἐπὶ δραχμῇ δανεισάμενος ἀποστερῇ, κἄν τις ἐν ἀγορᾷ βουλόμενος ἐργάζεσθαι δανείσηται παρά τινος ἀφορμήν· ἔτι δ’ αἰκείας καὶ ἐρανικὰς καὶ κοινωνικὰς καὶ ἀνδραπόδων καὶ ὑποζυγίων καὶ τριηραρχικὰς καὶ τραπεζιτικάς. [3] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτας δικάζουσιν ἐμμήνους εἰσάγ[ον]τες, οἱ δ’ ἀποδέκται τοῖς τελώναις καὶ κατὰ τῶν τελωνῶν, τὰ μὲν μέχρι δέκα δραχμῶν ὄντες κύρι[οι], τὰ δ’ ἄλλ’ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσάγοντες ἔμμηνα.
• Diog. Laert. 6.90 (Crates): ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀστυνόμων ἐπιτιμηθεὶς ὅτι σινδόνα ἠμφίεστο, ἔφη, “καὶ Θεόφραστον ὑμῖν δείξω σινδόνα περιβεβλημένον·” ἀπιστούντων δέ, ἀπήγαγεν ἐπὶ κουρεῖον καὶ ἔδειξε κειρόμενον.
• Philo Jud. Special Laws 4.21: ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ τῶν πόλεων αἱ εὐνομώταται διττοὺς ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ ἄρχοντας αἱροῦνται τῆς κοινῆς εὐκοσμίας καὶ ἀσφαλείας, τοὺς μὲν ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους, οὓς ἀστυνόμους προσαγορεύουσι, τοὺς δ’ ἐκτός, οἷς ὄνομα οἰκεῖον τίθενται, καλοῦσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀγρονόμους·
• The agoranomion at Athens: IG II² 3391
• Cheers for a good agoranomos: IG II² 3493
• Cheers for a young agoranomos: IG IV²1 653
• Cheers for a perpetual agoranomos: IG V.1 549 | 504
• Cheers for a scrupulous agoranomos: IG V.1 550
• Inscribed weights: I.Eph. 558.1 , 3493 | SEG XXXI 967 | I.Priene 360.2 |
  

w12

03/26 - FISHING AND FISH, DG

• Ørsted, "Salt, Fish and the Sea..."
  • [DG] I liked this article because I thought it presented ideas which intersect various sections of this course. How does the idea bona civitatis intersect with the ideas of taxation, as per the publicani? How about with agriculture (or, what type of property might it include)? What else might not be taxed other than what he discusses?
  • [DG] How about this undersea net fishing (20)?
  • [DG] I think there are alot of interesting scenarios posed here for the ground work of a fishing economy/industry. Presumably then, the big garum industries (Trakadas) could fish and salt their fish free of tax. When would they be taxed, at import/export?
  • [DG] Orsted frames this discussion in terms of social aid for the needy. Does this really seem necessary? It seems reminiscent of an upper burgeoise mentality, or perhaps legalistic.
• Bekker-Nielsen, "Nets, Boats and Fishing in the Roman World"
  • [DG] Does it seem likely that the places in Trakadas employed similar net styles?
  • [DG] Was it scalable? All the mosaics show 2 men in a small boat, but perhaps there were also more elaborate riggings employed.
• Trakadas, "The Archaeological Evidence for Fish Processing..."(Bibliography)
  • [DG] The compund at Troia (60-63) is huge. How many people do we think worked there? what was the make-up of this group? Individuals, a societas, a collegia? Or was there a patronus who "employed" all these people?
  • There seem to be villas associated with some of the smaller groupings of production stations along the coast. This seems to mimic what Terrenato was talking about with villas in the agricultural regions of Italy.
  • [DG] Consider this: The Spanish fisheries become "the major suppliers for Rome in the period from the first to the third centuries AD" (74). During the 3rd c., however, production is curtailed afterwards as the African suppliers start to take over (ibid). What happened at the end of 1st century? Emperors from Hispania comes to power (Trajan, Hadrian, Aurelius' father). Then, what happens at the beginning of the 3rd? Emperors from Africa (Severus, Clodius Albinus, maybe some others). Coincidence? We are not given exact dates (probably unknown), but perhaps there was some shifting in tastes Trakadas is ambiguous (75).
    • What might this say about an emperors ability to sway the public eating habits?
    • ...to sway the economy? Especially given that we are being told the power of the economy, production, was being moved out to the provinces?
• Davidson, "Fish, Sex and Revolution in Athens"
  • [DG] Do We think there was a similar dynamic in Rome (I can't think of any examples, other than the one mentioned), or is the class structure such that it doesn't manifest?
  • [DG] Thought this might be an interesting addendum for comparison purposes (amounts not to be trusted). From the Diocletian Price Edict, for context: V. 1. sea fish with rough scales, 24 den/lb. 2. fish of the second quality, 16 den/lb. 3. river fish of the best quality, 12 den/lb. 4. river fish of the second quality, 8 den/lb. 5. salted fish, 6 den/lb. 6. oysters, 100 den/100. 7. sea urchins, 50 den/100. 8. cleaned fresh sea urchins, 50 den/pint. 9. salted sea urchins, 100 den/pint. 10. sea mussels, 50 den/100. 11. dried cheese, 12 den/lb. 12. sardines, 16 den/lb. by contrast, pork is 12 den/lb., mutton and beef is 8 den./lb.
  • [DG] 64: What might Lacan have to say about fish and desire?
• Opp. III 640-648: τὰ δ’ αὐτίκα δίκτυα πάντα / ὥστε πόλις προβέβηκεν ἐν οἴδμασιν· ἐν δὲ πυλωροὶ / δικτύῳ, ἐν δὲ πύλαι, μύχατοί τ’ αὐλῶνες ἔασιν. / οἱ δὲ θοῶς σεύονται ἐπὶ στίχας, ὥστε φάλαγγες / ἀνδρῶν ἐρχομένων καταφυλαδόν· οἱ μὲν ἔασιν / ὁπλότεροι, τοὶ δ’ εἰσὶ γεραίτεροι, οἱ δ’ ἐνὶ μέσσῃ / ὥρῃ· ἀπειρέσιοι δὲ λίνων ἔντοσθε ῥέουσιν, / εἰσόκεν ἱμείρωσι καὶ ἀγρομένους ἀνέληται / δίκτυον· ἀφνειὴ δὲ καὶ ἔξοχος ἵσταται ἄγρη.
• Ael. NA XV 5: Ὅπως μὲν ἐσνέουσί τε ἐς τὴν Προποντίδα, καὶ ὅπως ἐκνέουσιν ἄρα οἱ θύννοι, οἶδα εἰπὼν ἄνω που τῶν λόγων τῶνδε· νοείτω δέ μοί τις ἐνταῦθα Ἡράκλειαν καὶ Τίον καὶ Ἄμαστριν, πόλεις Ποντικάς. οὐκοῦν οἱ τόνδε τὸν χῶρον πάντα οἰκοῦντες τὴν τῶν θύννων ἐπιδημίαν ἴσασι κάλλιστα, καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἀφικνοῦνται τηνικάδε τοῦ ἔτους, καὶ ὅπλα κατ' αὐτῶν εὐτρέπισται πολλά, ναῦς καὶ δίκτυα καὶ σκοπιὰ ὑψηλή. σκοπιὰ δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἐπί τινος αἰγιαλοῦ παγεῖσα ἀνέστηκεν ἐν περιωπῇ σφόδρα ἐλευθέρᾳ· καὶ αὐτῆς τὸ ποίημα περιηγήσασθαι ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι μόχθος .... δύο πρέμνα ἐλάτης ὑψηλὰ δοκίσι πλατείαις διειλημμένα ἕστηκε, πυκναῖς ταύταις διυφασμέναις καὶ ἀνελθεῖν τῷ σκοπῷ καὶ ἐπιβῆναι μάλα ἀγαθαῖς. αἱ δὲ ναῦς ἐρέτας ἑκάστη καὶ ἓξ ἔχει παρ' ἑκάτερα νεανίας εὖ μάλα ἐρέττοντας· δίκτυα δὲ προμήκη, οὐ κοῦφα λίαν καὶ ἀνεχόμενα τοῖς φελλοῖς, μολίβῳ γε μὴν βριθόμενα μᾶλλον. ἀθρόαι δὲ ἄρα αἱ τῶνδε τῶν ἰχθύων ἀγέλαι ἐσνέουσιν. …ὁ σκοπὸς ἰδὼν σοφίᾳ τινὶ ἀπορρήτῳ καὶ φύσει ὄψεως ὀξυωπεστάτῃ λέγει μὲν τοῖς θηραταῖς ὁπόθεν ἀφικνοῦνται· εἰ δέοι γε μὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀκτὴν παρατεῖναι τὰ δίκτυα, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκδιδάσκει· εἰ δὲ ἐνδοτέρω, δίδωσιν ὥσπερ οὖν στρατηγὸς τὸ σύνθημα ἢ χορολέκτης τὸ ἐνδόσιμον· ἐρεῖ γε μὴν πολλάκις καὶ τὸν πάντα ἀριθμόν, καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται τοῦ σκοποῦ. ἐκεῖνα δὲ ὁποῖα. ὅταν ἑαυτοὺς ὠθήσωσιν ἐς τὸ πέλαγος ἡ τῶν θύννων ἴλη, ὁ τὴν σκοπιὰν φυλάττων καὶ ἀκριβῶν τὴν τῶν προειρημένων ἱστορίαν καὶ μάλα ὀξὺ ἐκβοήσας λέγει διώκειν ἐκεῖθι καὶ τοῦ πελάγους ἐρέττειν εὐθύ. οἳ δὲ ἐξαρτήσαντες ἐλάτης τῶν τὸν σκοπὸν ἀνεχουσῶν τῆς ἑτέρας σχοῖνον εὖ μάλα μακρὰν τῶν δικτύων ἐχομένην, εἶτα ἐπαλλήλοις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐρέττουσι κατὰ στοῖχον, ἔχονταί τε ἀλλήλων, ἐπεί τοι καὶ τὸ δίκτυον ἐφ' ἑκάστῃ διῄρηται. καὶ ἥ γε πρώτη τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐκβαλοῦσα μοῖραν τοῦ δικτύου ἀναχωρεῖ, εἶτα ἡ δευτέρα δρᾷ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ τρίτη, καὶ δεῖ καθεῖναι τὴν τετάρτην· οἱ δὲ τὴν πέμπτην ἐρέττοντες ἔτι μέλλουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ οὐ χρὴ καθεῖναί πω· εἶτα ἐρέττουσι ἄλλοι ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄγουσι τοῦ δικτύου τὴν μοῖραν, εἶτα ἡσυχάζουσι. νωθεῖς δὲ ἄρα ὄντες οἱ θύννοι καὶ ἔργον τι τόλμης ἐχόμενον ἀδυνατοῦντες δρᾶσαι, πεπιεσμένοι μένουσί τε καὶ ἀτρεμοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ ἐρέται, ὡς ἁλούσης πόλεως, αἱροῦσιν ἰχθύων ποιητὴς ἂν εἴποι δῆμον.
• Faber, Fisheries of th Adriatic 111-112 on the tonnara.
• Some good images here.
• Tuna lookout here.
• Acraephia list here. lines 1-7: Τὺ ἀγώναρχυ τὺ ἐπ’ Ἀριστοκλεῖος ἄρχοντος, / Ἀμινίας Διονυσίω, Δικῆος Διονουσίω, / Ἱαροκλεῖς Ἐγχόρμαο, ἐσταλοκόπεισαν τὰ δεδο[γμένα] / οὑπὲρ τῶ θαλαττήω / τὼς δὲ τὸ θαλαττῆον πωλίοντας πωλῖμεν / σταθμῦς κο[θ]αροῖς
• What, in today's readings, is new? What is familiar?

DISCUSSION CHAIR: DG

03/28 - MONEY IN THE ROMAN WORLD, JF

• D. Rathbone, "Monetisation, Not Price-Inflation, in Third-Century A.D. Egypt?" in C. E. King and D. G. Wigg (eds.), Coin Finds and Coin Use in the Roman World (Berlin 1996) 321–339.
  • [JF] (322) Why was army pay raised in the third century, by Serverus, Caracalla and Maximius Thrax?
  • [JF] (322) If Rome did not have a systematic policy for recalling old coins and reminting, how did they know when to mint and how much to mint? What would have happened to all the worn coin? Could this add credence to Howgego’s skepticism about the significance of the quantative analysis of coin hoards and found coin (3)? Would there not just be vast amounts of worthless coin lying around?
  • [JF] (322) Rathbone argues that “debasement was a primarily a tactic used to create coinage to the total required face value out of inadequate stocks of bullion for minting on the previous standard” Do we have evidence that in Severus’ time there was a shortage of bullion? Had the mines decreased in production by this time? Could it be a conscious effort on the state to make more money, like in late third and second centuries BC, with the stephanephoroi, the cistophoroi and the symmachic silver?
  • [JF] To what extent would the users of coin have known that is was devalued? Would the state make it known that it was devalued? If the face-value of coinage was recognized throughout the Roman Empire, would the depreciation of coinage have made any noticeable difference to Romans, especially since we see a gradual devaluation of the denarius and the tetradrachm over a couple centuries. Were people inured to depreciation?
  • [JF] (324) As a response to the economic disruption after Severus’ reign, Rathbone states that the emperors may have exacted a levy, probably from the richest. This sounds like the practice of eisphora in Greece; did this happen regularly in Rome? Could it ever have worked?
  • [JF] (337) Why would the emperors have retariffed coinage? Would they not have known that it would completely destroy the credibility of the coinage?
  • [JF] Is it unusual that Rome allowed Egypt to keep the tetradrachm (also Syria or the cistophoroi in Asia)? Why didn’t Egypt adopt the denarius? I understand that Egypt was a closed economy, but would that be a benefit for Rome? Why didn’t Rome open up the economy?
  • [JF] I find it really interesting that there was a consistent and gradual debasement of the denarius from Nero’s reign up until 270. Why did this happen? Was it an effort by the emperors to make a profit or was it a reflection of a dwindling supply of bullion? Or maybe both?
• Howgego, "The Supply and Use of Money in the Roman World: 200 B.C. to A.D. 300," JRS 82 (1992) 1-31.
  • [JF] (1) Why did scholars think that all state expenditure had to be paid in new coin? Would it not make sense that new coin was minted for other reasons, like keeping up with needs of circulation, wages for magistrates and the construction of buildings (like in the Greek world)?
  • [JF] (1) Why does Howgego rail against quantitative studies so much? Is it not possible that both methods of studying coin are profitable, both by quantitative analysis and by examining the availability, supply and use of metal? Could each of these methods naturally be used to complement and inform the other?
  • [JF] (4) It does seem strange that very little bronze coinage was produced between the late second to the late first century B.C.. Howgego argues that the bronze coinage was so plentiful that it was still being used a hundred years later; do we have any other instances of coinage lasting for such a long time? Could the masses of gold and silver coin taken from booty in the second and first centuries BC have lasted until the third century, when we start seeing a degradation in coin? Could there be any other explanations?
  • [JF] (8) Why did silver mines fall into private hands between the second century and the early principate? Who owned them? Would Rome not want the silver for coinage? Or could they still rely on conquest for silver? Yet weren’t there occasionally coin shortages in the late Republic at Rome (10)? Wouldn’t a coin shortage imply that there wasn’t enough bullion? Or were there other reasons for a shortage? Ditto with the contractors--why didn’t Rome work the mines herself, instead of retaining a right to half of a mine’s output?
  • [JF] (11) Howgego states that gold coin only became regular in 46 BC, when it became a highly popular in Roman coinage. Why did this occur so late? Rome must have had ample access to gold mines before this date.
  • [JF] (13) In 49 BC, there was a shortage of coin (and hoarding was capped); there was also a shortage in Tiberius’ reign (as a result of Tiberius’ growing reserves). Why were these shortages allowed to happen? What was failing in the system?
  • [JF] (17) Why do certain scholars think that Egypt did not have a monetized economy? Since she had a monetized system before she was conquered, would it be beneficial or natural for Rome that she would revert to a barter system? Wouldn’t it be better for Rome that coin keep in circulation?
  • [JF] (18) When there was a coin shortage sometimes there was a large-scale production of local imitations to meet demand; what were “local imitations”? Were they made with debased metal? Who authorized them? For how long would they be in circulation?
  • [JF] (19) We mentioned in class the other day during Dan’s discussion that the military could been seen as an index of Romanization; this is something that may be popping up here repeatedly. In Howgego’s discussion about the extent of monetization in the frontier provinces, he argues that the soldiers’ use/injection of coinage had a significant impact on monetization in the development of the towns and villages. The spread of coin seems directly proportional to the spead of soldiers.
  • [JF] (21) Howgego is very skeptical about the use of quantative analysis to make observations on money supply, but is it not equally problematic to use literary sources (Apuleius’ Golden Ass, Cato’s De Agri Cultura) to make observations about the monetization of the countryside? How much experience did Apuleius have with the countryside? Or was he just reflecting city monetization practice onto the countryside? I am not arguing that there was not coinage in rural areas around the Empire, but just that the evidence may be equally as sticky.
  • [JF] (28) Howgego argues that banks could not transfer money form one place to another; Andreau (43) argues that this did take place, but just not very often, showing perhaps somewhat of a sophistication of banking, albeit not perhaps on the level of banks in the 4th century?
  • [JF] Also interesting is the constant presence of coin in tandem with the use of kind; was there a similar sort of situation in the Ancient Greece? Why was it so prevalent in the Roman world—since indeed, as Howgego argues, it acted as a brake on the level of monetization of the Roman world. Would there have been a considerable difference in the economy if payment had been paid entirely with coinage? Would it have made any difference in the long run?
• Duncan-Jones, Money and Government ch5-6
  • [JF] Duncan-Jones’ quantitative analysis of coin hoards shows a dazzling display of graphs, numbers and statistics; I think we get an entertaining alternative to the idea that hoards were either categorized as 'circulation' hoards or 'savings' hoards, but does it seem more like an interesting exercise than providing a viable alternative to the “barometer of insecurity” argument?
  • [JF] Are you all convinced by Duncan-Jones argument? Does he sufficiently offer an alternative to the “barometer of insecurity” argument? Does anyone have any other ideas?
  • [JF] (68) Duncan-Jones sets the threshold of the hoard in his sample at 100 denarii, whereas other scholars would set their threshold much lower (Bolin, e.g., set it at 20 denarii). What would Duncan-Jones be benefiting from here? If he leaves out the smaller hoards, which he states may have just been a product of incomplete survival, what affect would this have on his sample? How much would this threshold skew the statistics to his argument? I am grateful to the book review by W. Metcalf for this point (SNR 74 (1995):148).
  • [JF] (90) After stating that hoarding only loosely mirrors congiaria dates, Duncan-Jones writes that “the matching [of hoardes and congiaria] becomes more precise under the reign of Marcus Aurelius, when hoard evidence is most abundant. In the 160s, an unprecedented leap in the number of congiaria coincides with an unprecedented leap in the number of dated hoards.” What about the Antonine plague? Could this not account for unprecedented number of dated hoards? And also the state’s desire to give congiaria?

DISCUSSION CHAIR: JF 

w13

04/02 - LUXURY AGRICULTURE (with its logical precursors), CP 

• (A quick note re: the origins of ketchup before beginning any agricultural questions: the font of all knowledge tells me it comes from various places in eastern Asia, including China, the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia. Just in case it was bugging anyone else.)
• Evans. 1981. "Wheat Production and Its Social Consequences in the Roman World." CQ 31: 428-42.
  
  • [CP] My interest in ancient agriculture lies primarily in the didactic literary tradition and the social constructs related to it, so I hereby disclaim any sort of in-depth knowledge of mass agricultural production, including - but not limited to - grain production and transport, laws governing said production and transport, and pretty much any sort of non-literary source detailing anything related to agriculture.
  • [CP] The logical place to start with any sort of discussion of agriculture is with the essential: grain. Since it was a dietary staple - and since Rome's hinderland was particularly unable to provide enough for its mother city - its presence has been well-documented. I wonder, though, if we can ever consider grain to have been a luxury item, particularly in times of poor crops. Evans cites Livy, Columella and Pliny as extolling the value of Etrurian wheat in the late 3rd c. BCE - was this because it was one of the few regions reliably producing grain for the city? What other reason could there have been?
  • [CP] The literary sources for crop yields being contradictory and, well, literary isn't terribly surprising, is it? It is interesting (to me, at least) to note whence these exaggerations come: Cicero attributes 8/10x to Sicily, Varro 10/15x to Etruria (variations accounted for by soil differentiation), Varro and Pliny 100x to various African regions (entirely discreditable), and, of all people, Columella provides a ratio of 4x for grain production on the Italian peninsula. Is there any way that we can know crop yields (i.e. transaction records [which run the very likely risk of being a partial sale of total yield], records of bragging, or things of that sort)? Also, though I know it was a very productive region, just how productive was Egyptian agriculture?
  • [CP] Evans just barely touches on the issue of horticulture and the importance of gardens to the rural and urban peasantry (433); how influential could these horti have been in the production of luxury food? Urban gardens were more than likely bean pots for the poor and peacock-filled courtyards for the rich, but couldn't the rural horti (particularly in the more temperate zones near the Mediterranean) have provided a relatively low-impact and less labor-intensive (see Erdkamp, below) way to produce these luxury goods?
  • [CP] I see that we'll discuss alimenta next class, so perhaps this question is best left until then: the alimenta were designed to combat infanticide? Really? If this were true, how would the resulting boom in rural population have affected the agricultural work force and the division of land (see Erdkamp, below)? Could this have even worked? Perhaps I'm missing something that will become more evident later this week.
    
• Erdkamp. 1999. "Agriculture, Underemployment, and the Cost of Rural Labour in the Roman World." CQ 49: 556-72.
  • [CP] It's quite the vicious little cycle Erdkamp presents: to optimize labor potential, a farmer could focus on luxury goods instead of subsistence goods; the farmer would then be reliant on the ever-changing nature of commodity exchange in order to get basic sustenance; the risk might be unacceptable to the farmer, so he'd focus on the subsistence goods... which would result in under-optimization of labor (562-4). How does one get around this in terms of optimizing agricultural labor? Partitioning and/or specialization? Or just sucking it up and working the off-season jobs?
  • [CP] On that note, if the rural (peasant) farmers stuck primarily with subsistence crops (Erdkamp's "participating directly in food production" (564), whence came the luxury goods?
  • [CP] It makes sense that one of the primary off-season jobs for the farmer was in transporting his own goods to local markets (566). Erdkamp drops the "sailing" bomb once and promptly ignores any discussion of it (which is fitting, as it doesn't apply to the small-scale nature of most rural agriculture), but it does make me wonder about the more large-scale operations that transported grain across bodies of water. When was the typical grain harvest (outside of Egypt, which, from all accounts, appears to have been in constant season) and how did it correlate to the shipping seasons?
• Purcell. 2003. "The Way We Used to Eat: Diet, Community, and History at Rome." AJP 124: 329-58.
  • [CP] Where does Purcell get the idea for the "bipartite Mediterranean diet" as defined by a cereal and its complement (332)? How much water does this hold?
  • [CP] Aha! So, all grain was equal (in that it constituted a fair part of everyone's diet), but some grain was more equal than others ("There was a clear sense, moreover, that some grains were better than others, and this is to some extent reflected in the actualities of selection, preference, and obsolescence as far as they can be gauged from the archaelogical record ..." [333]). How much impact did the idea of the 'moral,' the 'historical,' and/or the nouveau have on the shifts in grain production and consumption? How conscious a shift was this - and how accurate can the later historical accounts be?
  • [CP] Purcell seems pretty happy to bring up the generic opposition of things Hellenic and Roman, applying everything from grain production (335) to meat consumption (340) to treatment of mythology and history (341) to this model. How well does this work (if at all)? Could there not have been more - and more significant - influences on dietary custom, particularly since mass agricultural production for the Italian peninsula was done pretty much everywhere but Greece?
  • [CP] Though it's an entirely separate and diverse and large topic, I feel it necessary to mention viticulture at this point. Its importance to the topic of luxury agriculture is compounded by the same problems as that of grain - it was prevalent throughout the Roman world, and so its status as a luxury item is dependent on subjective qualities that are not easily discerned. Still, wine was a huge industry and is phenomenally important. Just... not here.
• Bakels and Jacomet. 2003. "Access to Luxury Foods in Central Europe during the Roman Period: The Archaeobotanical Evidence." World Archaeology 34: 542-57.
  
  • [CP] This appears, at first glance, to be a fairly comprehensive selection of both foods and locations. Could anything have been done differently to achieve a different set of conclusions, and if so - what?
  • [CP] The authors consider eating black pepper and almonds as the "consumption of 'Roman' food" (547) - I guess I didn't realize how prevalent the Indian-grown black pepper was as a typical Roman food. Even Pliny complains as to the cost of importing the spice (NH 12.14); I see how it was luxury, yes, but 'Roman'?
  • [CP] Tracing the remains of Group 1 would prove fruitful (pun very much intended) as a trace of military officers and their numbers; following Group 3 would, I suppose, provide a better look at how Central Europe was Romanized. This would ultimately lead to the question of how foods can maintain their "luxury" status if their cultivation was successfully replicated by local farmers. How viable is this - can things such as gourds, figs and herbs still be considered "luxury" items? Better yet, what would you define as a "luxury" food item?

 DISCUSSION CHAIR: CP

• 04/04 - Alimenta and Demography
• Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire² ch.7
  • What was the basic debt mechanism on which the alimenta were funded?
  • What hurdles had to be cleared to make the mechanism work in perpetuity?
  • Which came first, imperial or private alimenta schemes? Does it matter?
  • [MM] This article leads me to wonder how much initiative at the local and regional levels existed for smaller magistrates.  Based on some of the things that Duncan-Jones brings to light, it seems like maybe what's going on here is the adoption, at the Imperial level, of a fundraising strategy initially restricted to the local stage.  A modern analogy might be if the federal government started using raffles, bake sales, and bikini carwashes to raise money to buy aircraft carriers.
• G. Woolf, "Food, Poverty and Patronage," PBSR 68 (1990) 197-228.
  • Woolf seeks explanations for th institution beyond 'rational' imperial policy. What range of 'rational policies' can we envisage that would be compatible with reconstruction?
  • What do you think now of Evans' argument, from last time?
  • CA: I buy this. However, can we be this cynical about Roman intentions? There are instances throughout Roman history of concern for the poor, so are were the elite really so thoughtless of the poor? They were known to riot (and secede) from time to time.
• Pliny, Ep. 7.18
  • How do you translate "pro quingentis milibus nummum ... mancipavi"? How does "ager ipse ... semper dominum ... inveniet" bear on your choice? What exactly was the transaction between Pliny and Comum? Cf. Duncan-Jones 298-299, Woolf 20.
• Frier, "Roman Demography"
• CA: Frier states that some economists have argued that population pressure has often been historically responsible for the changes in technology and patterns of land use that eventually raised the economic productivity of labor while bringing about more intensified forms of cultivation and land-augmenting investment, including the drainage of swampy lands and irrigation for multiple cropping. How much would slavery impact such a model? I would say quite a bit.
• [MM] A point that I don't think Frier adequately addresses, and which may muddle the already shaky accuracy of his demograhic ideas, is the fact that a large number of the lowest class, the poorest of the poor, would probably be too poor to be represented in census statistics.  As Josh always says, a large swath were simply too insignifcant to produce any kind of paperwork.  Also, these people would almost certianly have been unable to afford an inscribed grave marker.  This seems like a not insubstantial problem, given that two of Frier's preferred sources for information regarding mortality are census rolls and gravestones.  Of course, if we could include info on this underclass, we'd probably see that the mortality rate was even higher than Frier suspects.
• [MM] on pages 89-90, Frier suggests that Rome's low life expectancy indicates that Roman society essentially failed in providing its citizens with basic well-being.  Something that we may want to consider is that culturally, Romans did not necessarily value longevity as an indicator of happiness.  We know from lots of ancient authors that getting old was generally considered a pretty miserable thing, even among the upper classes who had the greatest access to medical technology.  Perhaps the lack of "basic health services" was culturally predicated?  In any case, I think it's important to recognize that many Romans considered it undesirable to live long past one's prime.  Thus, life expectancy alone cannot be used to determine the "effectiveness" of Roman society.  An extreme example of this kind of thing would be the fictional society in "Logan's Run."  A veritable utopia which, because of cultural predilections, has an extremely low life expectancy.
• [MM] When Frier talks about illegitimate children, I have to wonder if this too wouldn't complicate his demographic analysis.  How much bureaucratic attention would actually be paid to illegitimates?  How can we really know anything about them?
• [MM] I haven't come up with a source for this yet, but I'm almost positive that Frier's assertion that condoms were unknown in antiquity (98) is entirely false.  I don't remember where at the moment, but I'm sure I've read things about barrier contraception in the ancient world.
• [MM]  Maybe I'm confused.  On 106, Frier claims that the Empire may have been "dangerously debilitated by the stress of excessive population growth."  Doesn't he say early on that the growth rate would have been extremely slow?  Addendum:  in fact, yes, he does, on 88.

w14

04/09 - Babylon, CA

• Aperghis, Seleucid Royal Economy 87-113.
  • Perhaps we can begin by discussing the model. I think Aperghis provides an excellent argument for economic factors as the prime motivator for land grants and the like. Whether the Seleucids had a grand scheme or economic plan (that certainly varied from  reign to reign) makes sense. However, as we saw in Aristotles' Economics 2 - kings often tackled problems ad hoc. This is especially an issue with the Seleucid Empire which was so vast and eclectic. Confining our analysis regionally (as Aperghis has with Asia Minor and Babylonia) would be the most fruitful approach. Thoughts?
  • Page 90: A states that Greek populations were included into Babylonia for 'commercial reasons.' This deserves explanation. Does Aperghis mean that Greeks would have a better idea of how the Greco-Macedonian economic and commercial system worked? This could imply that cities were thought to be more administratively efficient? Then why did the kings depend so much on the temple estates?
  • Simple question: does it have to be military or economic? Why not both intertwined?
  • Documents: How would non-contiguous land work practically? What would be the perks of joining one town over another? Lower taxes at one, higher at the other? Why even allow this option? Seems like an administrative hassle, even though the land is privately used. I am reminded the estates in Roman Italy in some respects.
  • A fundamental question might be: If we take the political and religious motivations out, what are the economic benefits of granting lands to temples rather than cities? Were they better administrators or just easier to handle (I doubt)?
  • What about the Laodike land issue? I guess she gets this land (but pays for it) and he gets the frequent flyer miles. Do we buy Aperghis' argument (and van der Spek's) that the land has to be attached to temple, city, or royal land? I do not get the scenerio A mentions on 103 - if a buyer wants to remove the land from the city to which L attached it and not attach it to any other. Why mention this if the document says that "those buying or receiving from her will also have the right to attach to the city of their choice, unless L has made an earlier attachment to a city..."
• van der Spek, "Palace, Temple, and Market in Seleucid Babylonia"
  • Is it significant that there is no mention of policy in the astronomical diaries?
  • Based on this article and the others, can we agree that the Seleucid economy was a market economy?
  • "Kings also drew income from the temple properties and would take from them in times of need." This seems to further suggest that temples were more self-sufficient  or economically and administratively dependable than cities.
  • What about Boserups' theory that demographic growth increases innovation and agricultural production? 
  • Demand side: that foundation of Seleucia and the colony at babylon did not affect prices because other land was freed up. Does this make sense?
  • Link of wide coin circulation and military campaigns?
  • "Big organizations would have bought extra grain during scarcity, and flooded the market in times of abundance – not helping to regulate prices."
• McEwan, "Babylonia in the Hellenistic Period"
  • McEwan states that temples were the economic and cultural centers of Uruk, but under the Seleucids there was a move toward the civic sphere. What  economic impact did this have if any (e.g. lituries)? He does state that Uruk enjoyed great prosperity under the Seleucids.
  • The mixed nature of the terminology in the Babylonian administration (as shown in the cuneiform tablets) is perhaps the most interesting part of this article. We may recall the discussion on muhtasib. Can we, and if so - how can we - reconcile the different administrative terms for such offices that would seem important in any society. So many different kinds of sources. How can/should we use them?
  • Women in Babylonia: economic life remained the same? But what does this mean?
• Austin² nos. 163, 166, 167
  • 163:  Should we take it that Babylonian record seems to make a connection between the founding of Seleucia and economic hardships in Babylon? The lavishing of temples does not seem to indicate neglect (cgf 166)
  • What does this say about Babylon as an economic center as well as a cultural and political one?
  • 167: Strabo states that the Seleucids favored Seleucia and that helped lead to the decay of Babylon. How does this contradict or corroborate other accounts?
• OGIS 253
  • What does 'to found a city' really mean?
  • Foundation v. refoundation.
  • Is a ktises a founder or a builder?
  • SEG XXVI 1624
• IGLS VII 4028

DISCUSSION CHAIR: CA

04/11 - YOUR CALL, MM

• Bodel, "The Organization of the FUnerary Trade..."
  • The mention of workers for hire for the disciplining of slaves is interesting>  Is this a sign that punishment of slaves was a distasteful thing for owners to do themsleves?  Why would a slave-owner pay to have his slave punished rather than doing it himself?  Perhaps some other legislation existed which mandated the hiring of a "punisher?"
  • The denial of mourning to dead slaves is peculiar.  In Hopkins we are told that even slaves who had not been manumitted joined burial societies, so presumbaly were not denied proper funerary rites.  However, Hopkins is somewhat vague about why a slave's owner might refuse to give his body to the collegia; perhaps there is some connection between this and the Puteolan regulations about dead slaves?  Were the corpses of slaves considered somehow more dangerous or polluted than normal bodies?  Might this be a reason for an owner wanting to get rid of the body forthwith wthout thought to his slave's membership in a collegium? -- an addendum:  later on, Bodel mentions a passage from the Satyricon which includes the pouring of a libation for a dead slave.
  • What complications might arise when we consider the Puteolan regulations in light of what Hopkins says about the dead making complex provisions for their own funerals in their wills?
  • I find it really intriguing that undertakers were not themselves permitted to form collegia.  Not sure what kinds of things we can draw from this, but certainly something.
  • How might the formal regulation of a broad trade, which, beyond being simply "funerary," actually included (at least with Puteoli) just about anyone who did any kind of job related to death (executioners, floggers, and even people who dole out corporal punishment are all regulated by the Puteolan decree, and appear to have all been considered employees of the libitinarius), be in the public interest?  It seems to me that one of the main functions of this kind of monopolization and regulation would be to more easily keep tabs on everyone who did these kinds of unsavory jobs, and more easily keep them away from the rest of the community.
  • Why might no mention be made in the Puteloan inscription of couches, biers, musicians, mourning women, gladiators, or torches?  It seems to me that perhaps elements of funerary ritual were not regulated by the law, or rather were not considered the domain of the libitinarius, while anything which related to the bluntly logistical side of things was.

• Hopkins, "Death and Renewal," Ch. 4, sections III, VI, VII, VIII
  • The provisiosn in the Lanuvium collegium's rules against suicide is inetersting.  There is no specification of manner of death, so it cannot only apply to suicide by hanging, as the Puteolan law does.  Perhaps some members wished to get more bang for their buck by paying only their initial entry fee then killing themselves to avoid recurring monthly dues?
  • Again, I wonder why a slave's owner would refuse to hand his body over to the collegium.
  • Apparenlty, the funeral fee of 50 HS was to be disbursed to the mourners who attended a funeral?  This is interesting.  I wonder to whom the term "mourners" refers.  Was this little handout supposed to be a token for the family of the deceased, or a chance for other members of the collegium to recoup a little bit of their dues every now and then?
  • The stipulation that a slave who was manumitted would have to provide an amphora of good wine is puzzling.  Would a slave not normally have been expected, or able, to provide the wine stipulated as part of the entry fee?  Or is this just an extra fee?
  • The anecdote from Pliny is neat, just as Hopkins says, because it echoes a lot of popular tropes in modern ghost stories.  But what I find interesting about it is the possibility that the chains and shackles may not just be a creepy storytelling effect, but might in fact reflect attitudes towards the importance of proper burial.  The man whose funerary rites are neglected is literally and figuratively "shackled" to the world of the living.
  • The description of the "ritual sale" which characerized the execution of a will seems to demonstrate the extent to which death was considered an economic transaction between the dead (or soon-to-be-dead) and the living.
  • When Hopkins cites CIL 13.5708, it appears that the testator himself decided (arbitrarily, it seems) what the penalty for disobeying the stipulations of his will would be.  This seems entirely untenable to me.  Though if it's true, it's remarkable that, on the force of social customs, a certain measure of legislative power was invested in the dead.
  • If the municipal toilets in Ostia were made of old gravestones, is this not basically government-approved grave robbing?

• Stevens, "Charon's Obol..."
  • I wonder why it appears that the practice of using coins in burial ritual was more popular in Gaul?
  • Stevens point out the odd fact that the only grave at Poseidonia which had a representation of Charon painted on it did not include a coin.  Is this indicative of a more or less unsuperstitious occupant, or maybe a wry attempt to replace a monetary fare with "services rendered?"
  • The Platonic connection of the "invisible world" and the "invisible power" of money is quite intriguing.  Perhaps this explains why the material value of the coin used in funeral ritual was unimportant.  In the "invisible world," the physical value of the coin's metal was unimportant.  So too perhaps other worldly goods which could be used for economic exchange.  Only the "invisible" symbolic power of money, that is, the abstract principal of economic exchange, was truly important.  So it didn't matter how much money one had to give Charon, only that one had any at all, because worldly goods, including the physical coin itself, were worthless.  This is really just wild speculation, but wild speculation is fun.
  • I can't help but see the Catholic Treasury of Merit in its nascent stages when Stevens talks about Augustine.  Interesting.

• Garland, "The Well-Ordered Corpse"
  • While most of us have heard the familiar refrain that sumptuary funeral legislation was intended to curb the social visibility and power of aristocrats, I wonder if there was not an economic dimension as well.  After all, spending excessive amounts of money on funerary ostentation reduces the amount of capital which could otherwise be pumped into non-funerary sectors of the local economy.  This seems to be reflected in the legislation mentioned in Plato's Laws regarding the maximum expenditures for funerals based on property class.  This doesn't try to eliminate social stratification at all, just reduce its scale.
  • Many of the legislative programs mentioned by Garland specifically limit the amount of time an individual could remain in "mounring mode."  What impact might excessive mourning have on the economic life of a city, and why might reducing the length of this period be of such concern?

• Fraser and Nicholas, "The Funerary garden of Mousa"
  • There are lots of interesting tidbits in this inscription, but of most interest for our purposes should be the fact that the dead bodies themselves were considered the legal owners of the monument.
  • I wonder if the superlative which appears to mean "most un-saleable" is a formal legal term.
  • It is also interesting that this inscription is dedicated not just to the gods but to cthonic gods in particular.
  • The stipulation that the garden could not be transferred by will is interesting because it suggests that by exercising their own rights of last testament, Roman citizens could effectively limit those same rights for others.

• Isaeus 8
  • This speech highlights the problems which would arise when a large extended family fought over an inheritance:  in a decidedly non-bureaucratic society like Athens, it would conceivably be very difficult to prove one's lineage if it were contested, as is the case here, since records of such things simply wouldn't exist.
  • This speech is also a fantastic lens through wich to examine the immensely complicated laws and customs regarding control of patrimonies, and reminds us quite forcefully that the pragmatic flip-side of ritual devotion to the dead was an intense concern for what happened to their stuff once they were dead.
  • I swear I saw this done on film with Orson Welles as Diocles (that's not true in the slightest).

• Lex Libitinae Puteolana: AE (1971) 88 = EDR075111

DISCUSSION CHAIR: MM 

• Hodkinson, Property and Wealth... ch4
  • CA: I find his use of comparative models questionable.
  • CA: Strabo (8.5.4): prohibiting the sale of helots outside the boundaries:
    καὶ κριθῆναι δούλους ἐπὶ τακτοῖς τισιν, ὥστε τὸν
    ἔχοντα μήτ’ ἐλευθεροῦν ἐξεῖναι μήτε πωλεῖν ἔξω τῶν
    ὅρων τούτους·
• Hodkinson, "Servile and Free Dependents..."
  • CA: Hodkinson raises interesting and important questions such as whether helot mothers of nothoi would have special status in a Spartan oikos. However...
  •  
  • CA: Terminology: patron-client? I like 'personal dependency' better. Using Roman terminology for the Greek world always bothers me.
  • CA: Do we have evidence for 'favored helot families'?
• Cartledge, Sparta and Laconia... ch10